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International portfolio diversication is benecial only if asset returns are not sig-
nicantly correlated across countries. Therefore, it is essential for investors who
want to make an appropriate portfolio selection to understand the nature of asset
return correlations. This thesis consists of three essays on international comove-
ments of nancial markets.
The rst essay analyzes the e¤ects of heterogeneous beliefs and learning on
international comovements of equity returns and portfolio rebalancing mechanism.
This essay develops a continuous-time general equilibrium model in a two-asset
and two-good economy with two representative agents, who di¤er in perceived
rates of output growth and accuracy of beliefs. The equilibrium correlations of
equity returns across counties and optimal portfolios are expressed in terms of the
di¤erences in beliefs. The main ndings are: (1) the di¤erences in perceived rates
of output growth generate equity home or foreign bias, resulting in lower cross-
country equity return correlations; and (2) the volatilities of optimal portfolios and
capital ows increase with the di¤erences in perceived output growth and with the
di¤erences in accuracy of beliefs.
The second essay studies the e¤ects of trade costs in goods market on interna-
tional comovements of equity markets and those on equity home bias. This essay
develops a continuous-time general equilibrium model in a two-country, two-asset,
and two-good setting where international trade of goods is costly. I solve for the
optimal portfolios and the equilibrium correlations of cross-country equity returns
and analyze how they change depending on the size of trade costs, the coe¢ cient
of risk aversion, and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods. It is found that the cross-country equity return correlations decrease with
the size of trade costs. This result is robust to di¤erent sizes of trade costs and
asymmetry related to potential growth and consumer preferences. It is also found
that the size of the trade costs and other parameter values determine whether
trade costs would generate equity home bias or foreign bias.
The third essay is devoted to an empirical analysis of the e¤ects of nancial in-
tegration on international comovements of nancial markets. The essay provides a
characterization of synchronization among 24 countries over the period 1980-2003.
A country-pair panel instrumental variables framework is employed to explain
time-varying bilateral correlations among national stock returns, by utilizing the
dataset on trade costs in Fitzgerald (2008). It is found that nancial integration
driven by reduction of trade costs leads to a higher degree of synchromization
across stock markets.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Yusuke Tateno was born on July 28, 1983 in Chiba, Japan. After receiving his
high school diploma in 2002 from Kaisei Academy in Tokyo, Japan, he moved to
the US and attended Beloit College, a small liberal arts college in Wisconsin. He
received a BA in economics in 2005, earning Summa Cum Laude and Phi Beta
Kappa.
In August 2005, he enrolled as a graduate student in the economics department
of Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, majoring in international economics and
macroeconomics. His doctoral research, under the supervision of Professors Assaf
Razin, Eswar Prasad, and Viktor Tsyrennikov, focused on international comove-
ments of nancial markets. During his student career, he served as a consultant
to graduate students needing assistance with teaching methods and activities. He
also held short-term research positions at the International Monetary Fund and at
a private consulting rm.
After graduation, he will pursue his career as a public o¢ cial of the United
Nations where he was recruited through the National Competitive Recruitment
Exam in economics.
iii
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Fujio Tateno and Toshimi Tateno, who
taught me discipline, honor, and respect.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my thesis
advisors, Professors Assaf Razin and Eswar Prasad. It is a great honor for me
to be their PhD student. I appreciate all their contributions of time, motivation,
enthusiasm, patience, and immense knowledge. Their guidance helped me in all
the time of research and writing of this thesis. I would also like to thank my com-
mittee member Professor Viktor Tsyrennikov for his encouragement and insightful
questions.
My sincere thanks also go to Dr. Ayhan Kose and Dr. Marco Terrones of the
International Monetary Fund for o¤ering me the summer internship and research
opportunities in their groups and leading me working on exciting projects.
I gratefully thank Professors Tapan Mitra and Jennifer Wissink for providing
me teaching assistantships and for giving me an opportunity to work in their
team. I am also grateful to my peer advisor Dr. Kazuhiro Fujita for his continued
support and generosity throughout the years of my studies. In addition, I am
deeply indebted to my academic advisors from my undergraduate and high schools,
Professors Paul Campbell, Robert Elder, and Warren Palmer of Beloit College,
Wisconsin, Mineo Fukuchi and Tomoo Ariyama of Kaisei Academy, Tokyo, Japan
for enlightening me the rst glance of research.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, brothers and sister for all their
incessant support during all the years of my life. They are the reason for my
existence.
Yusuke Tateno, August 2011
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Biographical Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
1 Introduction 1
2 International Comovements of Equity Markets: The E¤ects of
Heterogeneous Beliefs and Learning 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2 Heterogeneous Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.3 Investment Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.4 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.5 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Correlations, Portfolios, and Capital Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.1 Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.2 Portfolio Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.3 Portfolio Rebalancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Equity Trade Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 Trade Costs in Goods Market and International Comovements of
Equity Markets 34
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.1 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.2 Investment Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.3 Trade Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.4 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.5 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3.1 Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3.2 Terms of Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.3 Asset Returns, Wealth Processes, and Optimal Portfolios . . 49
3.4 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
vi
4 Empirical Analysis on the E¤ects of Financial Integration on In-
ternational Comovements of Stock Markets 74
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A Proofs and Derivations 93
B Approximations for the Terms of Trade 98
C Malliavin Derivatives 101
vii
LIST OF TABLES
4.1 Sample Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2 Cross-sectional Estimates, 1992-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3 Panel Estimates, Four-year averages, 1980-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
3.1 Equity return volatility as a function of trade costs. . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 Di¤usion coe¢ cients of equity returns as a function of trade costs . 61
3.3 Terms of trade volatility as a function of trade costs . . . . . . . . 62
3.4 Di¤usion coe¢ cients of the terms of trade as a function of trade costs 62
3.5 Equilibrium covariance between equity returns and the terms of
trade as a function of trade costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.6 Shares of foreign equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.7 Degree of equity home bias as a function of trade costs. . . . . . . 64
3.8 Change in the terms of trade after a positive shock to Home pro-
duction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.9 Change in shares of foreign equity in domestic asset after a positive
shock to Home production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.10 Cross-country equity return correlations as a function of trade costs. 66
3.11 Equilibrium covariance between domestic and foreign equity returns
as a funciton of trade costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.12 Cross-country equity return correlations as a function of  and  
when  = 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.13 Cross-country return correlations as a function of  and  when
 = 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.14 Share of foreign equity in domestic wealth as a function of  and  
when  = 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.15 Share of foreign equity in foreign wealth as a function of  and  
when  = 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.16 Degree of equity home bias as a function of  and  when  = 2. . 69
3.17 Share of foreign equity in domestic wealth as a function of  and 
when  = 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.18 Share of foreign equity in foreign wealth as a function of  and 
when  = 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.19 Degree of equity home bias as a function of  and  when  = 5. . 70
3.20 Conditions for a negative association between the equilibrium cor-
relations and the size of trade costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.21 Equity return volatility as a function of trade costs. . . . . . . . . . 72
3.22 Cross-country equity return correlations as a function of trade costs. 72
3.23 Terms of trade volatility as a function of trade costs. . . . . . . . . 73
3.24 Shares of foreign equity in domestic asset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1 Financial Integration over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2 Stock Market Synchronization over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
ix
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
International portfolio diversication is benecial because it enables us to smooth
consumption by hedging against country-specic risks. However, cross-boarder in-
vestments may come at a cost in the presence of market frictions such as trading
costs of assets and heterogeneity in beliefs as they would change the nature of the
joint dynamics of asset returns across countries. If these market frictions and their
changes make equity returns signicantly correlated across countries, international
portfolios diversication would not be as benecial as it is supposed to be. Thus,
it is essential for investors who want to make an appropriate portfolio selection
to understand how market frictions a¤ect asset prices and dynamics. This thesis
consists of three essays on international comovements of nancial markets. Chap-
ter 2 analyzes the e¤ects of heterogeneous beliefs and learning on international
comovements of equity returns and portfolio rebalancing mechanism. Chapter 3
examines the mechanism of joint dynamics of asset returns across imperfectly in-
tegrated goods market. Finally, Chapter 4 contains an empirical analysis of the
e¤ects of nancial integration on international comovements of nancial markets.
Chapter 2 analyzes the e¤ects of heterogeneous beliefs and learning on the equi-
librium correlations of equity returns and portfolio rebalancing mechanism. Asset
prices and dynamics reect investorsbeliefs and preferences. Thus, heterogeneity
in beliefs and preferences plays an important role in the formation of portfolio
structure and capital ows across markets. This chapter develops a continuous-
time general equilibrium model in a two-asset and two-good economy with two
representative agents, who di¤er perceived rates of output growth and accuracy
of their beliefs. The equilibrium correlations of equity returns across countries
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and optimal portfolios are expressed in terms of the di¤erences in beliefs. The
main ndings are: (1) the di¤erences in perceived rates of output growth generate
equity home or foreign bias, resulting in lower cross-country equity return correla-
tions; and (2) the volatilities of optimal portfolios and capital ows increase with
the di¤erences in perceived output growth and with the di¤erences in accuracy of
beliefs.
Chapter 3 examines the e¤ects of trade costs in goods market on international
comovements of equity markets and those on equity home bias. Trade costs in
goods market are not a negligible market friction as pointed out by Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004): international trade costs such as transportation costs and
tari¤s are as high as 74 percent of production costs. Roughly speaking, since trade
costs in goods market a¤ect good prices and consumers behavior, they should also
a¤ect equity prices and their dynamics. This chapter analyzes the e¤ects of trade
costs in goods market on international comovements of equity markets and those
on equity home bias. The chapter develops a continuous-time general equilibrium
model in a two-country, two-asset, and two-good setting where international trade
of goods is costly. I solve for the optimal portfolios and the equilibrium correlations
of cross-country equity returns and analyze how they change depending on the
size of trade costs, the coe¢ cient of risk aversion, and the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods. It is found that the cross-country equity
return correlations decrease with the size of trade costs. This result is robust
to di¤erent sizes of trade costs and asymmetry related to potential growth and
consumer preferences. It is also found that the size of the trade costs and other
parameter values determine whether trade costs would generate equity home bias
or foreign bias.
2
Chapter 4 is devoted to an empirical analysis of the e¤ects of nancial integra-
tion on international comovements of nancial markets. In the last three decades,
we have observed a rapid increase in international nancial integration, not only
among industrial countries but also among most emerging market economics. We
have also witnessed evidence of rising comovements of cross-country equity re-
turns. This chapter examines how these two events are linked together, that is,
how nancial integration a¤ect international comovements of stock returns. The
chapter provides a characterization of synchronization among 24 countries over
the period 1980-2003. A country-pair panel instrumental variables framework is
employed to explain time-varying bilateral correlations among national stock re-
turns, by utilizing the dataset on trade costs in Fitzgerald (2008). It is found that
nancial integration driven by reduction of trade costs leads to higher degree of
synchronization across stock markets.
3
CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONAL COMOVEMENTS OF EQUITY MARKETS:
THE EFFECTS OF HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS AND LEARNING
This chapter analyzes the e¤ects of heterogeneous beliefs and learn-
ing on international comovements of equity returns and portfolio re-
balancing mechanism. This chapter develops a continuous-time gen-
eral equilibrium model in a two-asset and two-good economy with two
representative agents, who di¤er in perceived rates of output growth
and accuracy of beliefs. The equilibrium correlations of equity returns
across countries and optimal portfolios are expressed in terms of the
di¤erences in beliefs. The main ndings are: (1) the di¤erences in per-
ceived rates of output growth generate equity home or foreign bias,
resulting in lower cross-country equity return correlations; and (2) the
volatilities of optimal portfolios and capital ows increase with the dif-
ferences in perceived output growth and with the di¤erences in accuracy
of beliefs.
2.1 Introduction
Asset prices and dynamics reect investorsbeliefs and preferences. Thus, het-
erogeneity in beliefs and preferences should be important factors to be considered
in portfolio selections and cross boarder investments. This chapter analyzes the
e¤ects of heterogeneous beliefs and Bayesian learning on stock return comove-
ments and portfolio rebalancing mechanism. To this aim, the chapter develops a
continuous-time general equilibrium model in a two-asset and two-good economy
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with two representative agents, who di¤er in preferences, perceived output growth,
and accuracy of their beliefs.
Heterogeneous beliefs can capture the phenomenon such that local investors
are better informed about the local production than cross-border investors. The
literature has been modeling it in such a way that investors receive common infor-
mation but interpret it in di¤erent ways. The early works of the literature include
Varian (1985, 1986), Abel (1990), and Harris and Raviv (1993), where a static
discrete-time setting is employed. The development of the continuous-time models
allow the di¤erent subjective beliefs to be arose from a Bayesian learning of the
investors perceived output growth potential as in Williams (1997), Detemple and
Murthy (1994), Basak (2000, 2005), Gallmeyer and Hollield (2008).
The paper builds up on these continuous-time models by adding an asymmetry
related to accuracy of beliefs. It is typically assumed that accuracy of beliefs are
the same across investors for simplicity, and therefore the investorsbehavior is
simply a¤ected by their initial perceived levels of output growth. In this chapter,
investors also di¤er in accuracy of perceived output growth (i.e. one has more
accurate perception than the other), which may further a¤ect their investment
behavior. This assumption is to model more precisely the di¤erence between do-
mestic and cross-border investment. Typically, domestic investors have accurate
perception about the economic fundamentals about their own countries than the
foreign investors, though they may sometime become over-condent about the po-
tential of their own production. The model also includes demand uncertainty and
consumption home bias, so that investor behavior is not purely derived from out-
put risk sharing. The reason for adapting a two-good setting is to allow the terms
of trade to be deviate from unity as existing works show that the terms of trade
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volatility is one of the important factors which inuence the degree of stock return
comovements (Fratzscher, 2002).
Another contribution of the chapter is to allow output shocks to play a role
in portfolio rebalancing mechanism, apart from wealth e¤ects. In a conventional
case where investors have homogeneous beliefs and preferences, investors rebalance
portfolio purely due to the change in wealth, keeping portfolio structure unchanged.
However, with heterogeneous beliefs, investors adjust their portfolio not only in
response the changes in wealth but also by changing portfolio structure through
updating beliefs. Portfolio rebalancing mechanism is now decomposed into three
parts: wealth e¤ects, portfolio adjustment due to the realization of demand shocks,
and portfolio adjustment due to updating their beliefs in response to the realization
of supply shocks.
The model is based on the literature of good and asset trades under uncertainty
in an international context (Helpman and Razin, 1978; Cole and Obstfeld, 1991).
It is also closed related to the works on international comovements of equity mar-
kets such as Zapatero (1995), Pavlova and Rigobon (2007), and Soumare (2007).
Zapatero (1995) shows that equity markets are perfectly correlated internationally
under the assumption of logarithmic preferences. Pavlova and Rigobon (2007)
extends the work by Zapatero (1995) and show that, with existence of demand
shocks, equity markets are not perfectly correlated internationally even under the
assumption of the logarithmic preferences as investors hedge against their own de-
mand risks. Soumare (2007) uses CRRA preferences and concludes that the perfect
correlation between stock markets does not hold under more general specications
of utility. This chapter extends the works by Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) by tak-
ing into account the e¤ects of heterogeneous beliefs and learning and provides full
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characterization of return comovements and portfolio rebalancing.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents an in-
ternational asset pricing model where representative agents have time-additively
separable logarithmic preferences, and characterize the equilibrium. Section 2.3
show that stock market correlations decrease in the di¤erences in perceived out-
put growth. The dynamics of stock prices and optimal portfolios are derived in
closed-form. Section 2.4 discusses an alternative source of market frictions and
their e¤ects on stock market correlations. Section 2.5 contains my conclusions.
2.2 The Model
This section presents a two-country, two-asset, two-good asset pricing model under
incomplete information.
2.2.1 Production
The chapter considers a continuous-time Lucas-type pure-exchange economy with
nite horizon T . The economy consists of two countries: Home and Foreign,
respectively denoted by H and F . The uncertainty in this economy is represented
by a ltered probability space (
;z; fztg ; P ), on which is dened a standard three-
dimensional Brownian motion w (t) =
 
wH (t) ; wF (t) ; w (t)
T
. The Brownian
motions wH (t), wF (t), and w (t) capture country-specic production risk in H,
country-specic production risk in F , and relative demand risk, respectively.
Each country specializes in producing its own good. The amount of goods
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produced in country i 2 fH;Fg follows a geometric Brownian process:
dY H (t) = Y H (t)
h
Y
H
dt+ Y
H
dwH (t)
i
, (2.1)
dY F (t) = Y F (t)
h
Y
F
dt+ Y
F
dwF (t)
i
where Y
H
and Y
F
denote rates of output growth, and Y
H
and Y
F
denote
di¤usion parameters of the output growth. These four parameters are constant
and exogenous. The terms of trade are dened as the price of the Foreign goods
relative to the price of the Home goods. By normalizing the price of the Home
goods (pH (t) = 1), the terms of trade can be written as p (t)  pF (t) =pH (t), and
follows a geometric Brownian process:
dp (t) = p (t)
h
p (t) dt+ p (t)T dw (t)
i
(2.2)
where p (t) and p (t) are the drift and di¤usion parameters of the process and
determined at the equilibrium.
2.2.2 Heterogeneous Beliefs
Even though the investors commonly observe the realized output Y H (t) and Y F (t),
they do not know true growth rates of output Y H and Y F . This assumption has
been widely made in the literature such as Basak (2000, 2005), and Gallmeyer and
Hollield (2008). Since outputs are observed continuously, all investors perfectly
estimate its volatility Y H and Y F by computing the output processs quadratic
variation (Gallmeyer and Hollield, 2008). As discussed in the introduction, the
initial levels of precision are typically assumed to be the same across investors for
simplicity, and therefore the investorsbehavior is simply a¤ected by their initial
levels of perceived output growth. In this model, investors di¤er in the initial
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levels of accuracy of beliefs (i.e. one is better informed than the other), which
may further a¤ect the investment behavior. To be precise, the Home investor has
a higher (lower) precision on the perceived growth rates of the Home (Foreign)
production than the Foreign investor. This assumption is to model more accurately
the di¤erence between domestic and cross-border investment.
Investor is prior is normally distributed with mean ji (0) and variance v
j
i (0)
to the rate of production growth in country
k 2 fH;Fg : Y k (0)  N

Y
k
i (0) ; v
Y k
i (0)

. (2.3)
vY
k
i (0) can be interpreted as the level of precision or condence. Both 
Y k
i (0)
and vY
k
i (0) are private information. It can be assumed without loss of generality
that vY
i
i (0) > v
Y i
k (t) ; i 6= k. This assumption is realistic since the domestic
investors tend to know better about the production in their own country than the
foreign investors. Investors continuously update their beliefs in a Bayesian fashion
as they observe the level of production Y H (t) and Y F (t). Following Cherno¤
(1968) and Liptser and Shiryayev (2001), the investors posterior distribution can
be expressed as:
Y
k
(t)  N

Y
k
i (t) ; v
Y k
i (t)

(2.4)
where
Y
k
i (t) = v
Y k
i (t)

Y
k
i (0)

vY
k
i (0)
 1
+

Y
k
 2 Z t
0
dY k (u)
Y k (u)

, (2.5)
vY
k
i (t) =

vY
k
i (0)
 1
+

Y
k
 2
t
 1
.
Dene the data generating process which is conditional on the information
available to investor i as wki (t), k 2 fH;Fg. For investor i, each production
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process is viewed as
dY k (t) = Y k (t)
h
Y
k
i (t) dt+ 
Y kdwki (t)
i
By rearranging the terms, we get:
dwki (t) =
1
Y k

dY k (t)
Y k (t)
  Y ki (t) dt

=
1
Y k
h
Y
k   Y ki (t)
i
dt+ dwk (t)
Therefore, the data generating process which is conditional on the information
available to investor i is
dwi (t) =
0BBBB@
1
Y H
h
Y
H   Y Hi (t)
i
dt
1
Y F
h
Y
F   Y Fi (t)
i
dt
0
1CCCCA+ dw (t) . (2.6)
2.2.3 Investment Opportunities
There are two nancial securities in each country: a risky stock and a locally risk-
free bond. Denote the prices of the Home stock, Foreign stock, Home bond, and
Foreign bond by SH , SF , BH , and BF , respectively. All of them are dened in
units of the numeraire good, i.e., the Home goods. The returns and volatilities of
investable assets under the investor is beliefs are:
dBH (t) = BH (t)B
H
i (t) dt, (2.7)
d

p (t)BF (t)

= p (t)BF (t)
h
pB
F
i (t) dt+ 
pBF
i (t)
T dwi (t)
i
,
dSH (t) + Y H (t) dt = SH
h
S
H
i (t) dt+ 
SH
i (t)
T dwi (t)
i
,
dSF (t) + p (t)Y F (t) dt = SF
h
S
F
i (t) dt+ 
SF
i (t)
T dwi (t)
i
where B
H
i (t) and 
BF
i (t) are the rates of returns in bond markets, 
SH
i (t) and
S
F
i (t) are perceived asset returns in equity markets, and 
SH
i (t) and 
SF
i (t) are
10
volatility of asset returns. All variables for prices, returns, and volatilities are to
be determined at the equilibrium. The di¤usion parameter of the Foreign bond
returns is not necessarily zero since the Foreign bonds are not riskfree in units of
the Home goods. They are riskfree only in terms of the Foreign goods. Because
there are four securities and three sources of uncertainty, the market is potentially
dynamically complete.
Since the Home and Foreign investors agree to the asset prices, no arbitrage
condition holds and implies
pB
F
H (t) = 
pBF
F (t) = 
p (t)
S
H
H (t) = 
SH
F (t) = 
SH (t)
S
F
H (t) = 
SF
F (t) = 
SF (t)
B
H
H (t) = 
BH
F (t) = r (t)
 ! F (t)  !H (t) =  (t)T
0BBBB@
Y
H
F (t) Y
H
H (t)
Y H
Y
F
F (t) Y
F
H (t)
Y F
0
1CCCCA (2.8)
where i (t) =

S
H
i (t) 
SF
i (t) 
pBF
i (t)
T
is a vector of is perceived asset
returns, and  (t) 
h
S
H
(t) S
F
(t) p (t)
i
is a volatility matrix for the
investable asset returns. r (t) can be interpreted as a riskfree rate. Investors agree
to the asset volatilities, but agree to disagree to the perceived asset returns. The
di¤erence in the perceived asset returns is expressed in terms of the di¤erence in
the perceived production growth.
Consider the case where heterogeneous beliefs are asymmetry related to the
center of perceived growth. Following the literature such as Gallmeyer and Hol-
lield (2008), I assume that local investors are more optimistic than cross-border
investors, that is, Y
H
H (0) > 
Y F
H (0) and 
Y F
F (0) > 
Y F
H (0). For simplicity, I also
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assume that the initial levels of precision are the same across investors, that is,
vY
k
H (0) = v
Y k
F (0) = v
Y k (0) ; k 2 fH;Fg. The prior and posterior distributions are,
for each production k 2 fH;Fg,
Y
k
(0)  N

Y
k
i (0) ; v
Y k (0)

,
Y
k
(t)  N

Y
k
i (t) ; v
Y k
i (t)

where
Y
k
i (t) = v
Y k (t)

Y
k
i (0)

vY
k
(0)
 1
+

Y
k
 2 Z t
0
dY k (u)
Y k (u)

,
vY
k
(t) =

vY
k
(0)
 1
+

Y
k
 2
t
 1
.
Given that the initial levels of precision are the same across investors, the di¤erence
in the levels of precision stay the same over time. The di¤erence in perceived asset
returns depends on the di¤erence in the initial perceived output growth and is given
by
 ! F (t)  !H (t) =  (t)T
0BBBBB@
Y
H
(Y H )
2
+vH(0)t

Y
H
F (0)  Y HH (0)

Y
F
(Y F )
2
+vF (0)t

Y
F
F (0)  Y FH (0)

0
1CCCCCA (2.9)
Now I describe the case where heterogeneity in beliefs is asymmetry related
to the levels of precision. In particular, I assume that vY
k
H (0) 6= vY kF (0) ; k 2
fH;Fg, whereas the initial perceived output growth rates are the same: Y HH (0) =
Y
H
F (0) = 
Y H (0) and Y
F
F (0) = 
Y F
H (0) = 
Y F (0). As before, investors do not
know other investors belief nor the accuracy of her/his own beliefs. The posterior
and prior distribution of investor is beliefs are:
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Y
k
(0)  N

Y
k
(0) ; vY
k
i (0)

; i 2 fH;Fg ; k 2 fH;Fg ,
Y
k
(t)  N

Y
k
i (t) ; v
Y k
i (t)

; i 2 fH;Fg ; k 2 fH;Fg
where
Y
k
i (t) = v
Y k
i (t)

Y
k
(0)

vY
k
i (0)
 1
+

Y
k
 2 Z t
0
dY k (u)
Y k (u)

,
vY
k
i (t) =

vY
k
i (0)
 1
+

Y
k
 2
t
 1
.
Although the initial perceived output growth rates are the same, the perceived
output growth rates can be di¤erent over time. The di¤erence in perceived asset
returns are given by
 ! F (t)  !H (t)
=  (t)T
0BBBBB@
(vHH (0) vHF (0))h
(Y H )
2
+vHF (0)t
ih
(Y H )
2
+vHH (0)t
i hY H (0) t  R t
0
dY H(u)
Y H(u)
i
(vFH(0) vFF (0))h
(Y F )
2
+vFF (0)t
ih
(Y F )
2
+vFH(0)t
i hY F (0) t  R t
0
dY F (u)
Y F (u)
i
0
1CCCCCA(2.10)
2.2.4 Preferences
Each country is populated by a representative agent who has time-additively sep-
arable logarithmic preferences and they can be represented as follows:
Ui (0) = Ei;0
Z T
0
e ti (t)
 
ai ln c
H
i (t) + (1  ai) ln cFi (t)

dt

; i 2 fH;Fg .
(2.11)
where ai 2 (0; 1) measures the degree of home bias and satises aH +aF = 1. The
assumption of consumption home bias is equivalent to aH > aF . i (t) represents
13
relative preference shocks, and satises i (0) = 1,
di(t)
i(t)
= 
i
dw and 
H 6= F .
Without a loss of generality, we can assume 
H
> 
F
.
The wealth process of agent i expressed in units of the Home good is
dWi (t)
Wi (t)
= xS
H
i (t)

dSH (t) + pH (t)Y H (t) dt
SH (t)

(2.12)
+xS
F
i (t)

dSF (t) + pF (t)Y F (t) dt
SF (t)

+
xB
H
i (t)

dBH (t)
BH (t)

+ xB
F
i (t)
 
d

p (t)BF (t)

p (t)BF (t)
!
   cHi (t) + p (t) cFi (t) dt
where cHi (t) and c
F
i (t) are investor is consumption. At t = 0, each investor
owns the entire stock in her/his own country (i.e., WH (0) = SH (0), and WF (0) =
SF (0)).
Matching the di¤usion terms gives us the condition that the optimal portfolio
satises
xi (t) =
0BBBB@
xS
H
i (t)
xS
F
i (t)
xB
F
i (t)
1CCCCA =  (t) 1 Wi (t) (2.13)
where xi (t) =

xS
H
i (t) x
SF
i (t) x
BF
i (t)
T
is a vector of shares for is wealth
invested on each asset, and  (t) =
h
S
H
(t) S
F
(t) p (t)
i
is a volatility
matrix of asset returns. This implies that the optimal portfolio can be derived in
closed-form if the volatility of investorswealth can be expressed in closed-form.
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2.2.5 Equilibrium
Denition 1 Given beliefs, preferences and initial endowments, a competitive
equilibrium is a collection of adapted processes for asset prices, consumption 
cHi (t) ; c
F
i (t)

, and asset allocations

xS
H
i (t) ; x
SF
i (t) ; x
BF
i (t)

, i 2 fH;Fg, such
that
cHi (t) ; c
F
i (t) ; x
SH
i (t) ; x
SF
i (t) ; x
BF
i (t)

is a solution to agent is optimization prob-
lem, and all markets clear for all t 2 [0; T ],
cHH (t) + c
H
F (t) = Y
H (t) (Home good)
cFH (t) + c
F
F (t) = Y
F (t) (Foreign good)
WH (t)x
SH
H (t) +WF (t)x
SH
F = S
H (t) (Home stock)
WH (t)x
SF
H (t) +WF (t)x
SF
F (t) = S
F (t) (Foreign stock)
WH (t)x
BH
H (t) +WF (t)x
BH
F (t) = 0 (Home bond)
WH (t)x
BF
H (t) +WF (t)x
BF
F (t) = 0 (Foreign bond)
(2.14)
Each agents dynamic consumption-portfolio problem can be converted into the
static problem using martingale techniques (Cox and Huang, 1989; Karatzas et al.,
1987).
max
fcHi ;cFi g
Ei;0
Z T
0
e ti (t)
 
ai ln c
H
i (t) + (1  ai) ln cFi (t)

dt

(2.15)
subject to E0
hR T
0
i (t)
 
cHi (t) + p (t) c
F
i (t)

dt
i
5 Wi (0) ;
where i is the state price density process. i can be understood as the price
faced by agent i of a security paying dt at time t, and it follows the dynamics
di (t) = i (t)
h
 r (t) dt  i (t)T dwi (t)
i
with i (0) = 1. These state price den-
sity processes are investor-specic since they face heterogeneous equilibrium price
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dynamics. The market price of risk i (t) is dened as
i (t) =

 (t)T
 1  ! i (t)  r (t) !1  (2.16)
where  (t) =
h
S
H
(t) S
F
(t) p (t)
i
where
 !
1 = (1 1 1)T is a three-dimensional vector of ones. In Section 2.3,
I nd that the di¤erence in the perceived asset returns is expressed in terms of
the di¤erence in the perceived production growth. The di¤erence in the market
price of risk can be expressed in terms of the di¤erence in the perceived production
growth.
F (t)  H (t) =

 (t)T
 1   ! F (t)  !H (t) (2.17)
The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for optimal consumption are
e ti (t) aicHi (t) = yii (t) (2.18)
e ti (t) (1  ai) cFi (t) = yii (t) p (t)
where yi is the Lagrange multiplier such that the budget constraint holds with
equality at the optimum.
Since nancial markets are potentially dynamically complete, the equilibrium
prices of the nancial securities are identical to those in an aggregated represen-
tative agent economy where the representative agent has the following aggregate
intratemporal utility function:
U
 
Y H (t) ; Y F (t)

= H (t)
 
aH ln c
H
H (t) + (1  aH) ln cFH (t)

(2.19)
+ (t) F (t)
 
aF ln c
H
F (t) + (1  aF ) ln cFF (t)

subject to cHH (t) + c
H
F (t) = Y
H (t) , and cFH (t) + c
F
F (t) = Y
F (t) :
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The stochastic weighting process  (t) represents the relative welfare weight of the
Foreign agent and is identied as
 (t) =
yH
yF
H (t)
F (t)
. (2.20)
Itos Lemma gives us the drift and di¤usion terms of the stochastic weighting
process:
 (t) = F (t)  H (t) =

 (t)T
 1   ! F (t)  !H (t) (2.21)
 (t) =  (t)  F (t)
The equilibrium is characterized as follows. The agentsoptimal consumption al-
location rules are
cHH (t) =
H (t) aH
H (t) aH + F (t) aF (t)
Y H (t) ; (2.22)
cHF (t) =
F (t) aF (t)
H (t) aH + F (t) aF (t)
Y H (t) ;
cFH (t) =
H (t) (1  aH)
H (t) (1  aH) + F (t) (1  aF ) (t)Y
F (t) ;
cFF (t) =
F (t) (1  aF ) (t)
H (t) (1  aH) + F (t) (1  aF ) (t)Y
F (t) :
The equilibrium investor-specic state price density is given by
H (t) =
e t
yH
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
Y H (t)
; (2.23)
F (t) =
e t
yF
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
 (t)Y H (t)
:
The terms of trade and volatility are given by
p (t) =
H (t) (1  aH) +  (t) F (t) (1  aF )
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
Y H (t)
Y F (t)
(2.24)
p (t) = A (t)
 
H   F    (t)+ Y H   Y F
17
where A (t) =   (t)H(t)F (t)(aH aF )
[H(t)aH+F (t)aF(t)][H(t)(1 aH)+F (t)(1 aF )(t)] .
(2.25)
This A (t) is strictly negative if consumption home bias exists and strictly increas-
ing with the degree of consumption home bias.
The market prices of risks are given by
H (t) = 
Y H   H (t) aH
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
H (2.26)
   (t) F (t) aF
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
 
F +  (t)

F (t) = 
Y H   aHH (t)
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
 
H    (t)
   (t) F (t) aF
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
F
The formal derivation of the market prices of risks are given in the appendix.
Finally, the stock prices and dynamics are
SH (t) = EH;t
Z T
t
H (s)
H (t)
Y H (s) ds

(2.27)
= Y H (t)
1  e (T t)

SF (t) = EH;t
Z T
t
H (s)
H (t)
p (s)Y F (s) ds

= p (t)Y F (t)
1  e (T t)

S
H
(t) = Y
H
S
F
(t) = Y
F
+ p (t)
The formal derivation of the stock prices and volatilities are given in Appendix A.
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2.3 Correlations, Portfolios, and Capital Flows
2.3.1 Correlations
Understanding correlations of asset returns is an essential component of portfolio
selection process. The Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) tells us that investors can
reduce their exposure to risk by holding a combination of weakly correlated as-
sets. When two stock returns are uncorrelated, for instance, agents can reduce the
volatility of portfolio returns by investing in both stocks. On the other hand, when
two stock returns are highly and positively correlated, it becomes more di¢ cult
to diversify their portfolio risks. Furthermore, the extent of stock market syn-
chronization has an important policy implication since it indicates to what degree
external shocks could be transmitted into the domestic capital market. Before im-
plementing new government policies (e.g. lowering foreign income tax), one should
assess how such policy changes a¤ect vulnerability of the domestic capital market
to external shocks.
This subsection considers the covariances and correlations between the Home
and Foreign stock returns. The covariance between two stock returns is given by
SHSF (t) = Y HY F + Y Hp (t) (2.28)
The rst term represents the fundamental comovements; and the second term
represents the excess comovements through the terms of trade.
The correlation between two stock returns is given by
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SHSF (t) =
SHSF (t)
kSH (t)k kSF (t)k
(2.29)
=
YH 
  A (t) (t) + Y H
kY H k kA (t) (H   F    (t)) + Y H k
The derivation of the correlation between two stock returns is given in Appendix
A.
In equilibrium in a frictionless economy (i.e., when  (t) is deterministic) and
no e¤ective demand uncertainty (H = F ), the two stock prices are perfectly
correlated. For example, a positive output shock in the Home output increases
the Home stock price. However, due to relative abundance of the Home goods,
the terms of trade move against the Home output, which in turn move in favor of
the Foreign output. Hence, the value of the Foreign goods rises, thereby providing
a boost to the Foreign stock price. It can be viewed as shock transmission through
the perfect terms-of-trade adjustment. This result is consistent with Zapatero
(1995) and Pavlova and Rigobon (2007). Perfect correlation does not hold when
the demand uncertainty is ine¤ective (H 6= F ) or when any heterogeneity in
beliefs is present (i.e., when  (t) is stochastic).
The derivative of the correlations between two stock returns SHSF with respect
to the degree of consumption home bias a at t = 0 is
dSHSF (0)
da
< 0, (2.30)
which implies that stock market correlations decrease with the degree of consump-
tion home bias. The detailed derivation of this is given in Appendix A.
The derivative of the correlations between two stock returns SHSF with respect
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to the di¤erence in the initial levels of perceived output growth  at t = 0 is
dSHSF (0)
d
< 0, (2.31)
which again implies that stock market correlations decrease with the di¤erences in
the initial levels of perceived output growth rates.
The following proposition summarizes the ndings from this subsection.
Proposition 2 1. Stock market correlations decrease in the degree of consump-
tion home bias. 2. Stock market correlations decrease in the di¤erences in initial
perceived output growth. 3. Perfect correlation between two stock returns hold when
there is no information friction ( (t) = 0) and no e¤ective demand uncertainty
(H = F ).
2.3.2 Portfolio Choice
This subsection derives agentsoptimal portfolio in closed-form under the assump-
tion of time-additively separable logarithmic preferences. Stock market correla-
tions discussed in the previous subsection can be also explained by the portfolio
rebalancing channel. A positive supply shock in the Home country increases wealth
of investors who own the Home stock. This wealth expansion increases the demand
of the Foreign stock, which results in the increase in the Foreign stock price.
The di¤usion terms of the dynamic budget constraint implies
WH (t) =  (t) xH (t) (2.32)
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where xH (t) =
h
xS
H
H (t) x
SF
H (t) x
BF
H (t)
iT
and
 (t) =
h
S
H
(t) S
F
(t) p (t)
i
.
The wealth dynamics can be derived by applying Itos Lemma to the wealth
equation derived earlier.
WH (t) = Y
H
+
 (t) F (t) aF
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
 
H   F    (t) (2.33)
WF (t) = Y
H   aHH (t)
H (t) aH + F (t) aF (t)
 
H   F    (t)
The optimal portfolio is given by matching the right hand sides of equations 2.32
and 2.33
xH (t) =  (t)
 1 Y
H
(2.34)
+
 (t) F (t) aF
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
 (t) 1
 
H   F  (2.35)
   (t) F (t) aF
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
 (t) 1
  ! F (t)  !H (t)
xF (t) =  (t)
 1 Y
H
(t) (2.36)
  aHH (t)
H (t) aH + F (t) aF (t)
 (t) 1
 
H   F  (2.37)
+
aHH (t)
H (t) aH + F (t) aF (t)
 (t) 1
  ! F (t)  !H (t)
Since the rst two terms also appear in optimal portfolios from the frictionless case,
the third term is a component of optimal portfolios generated by heterogeneity in
beliefs. Dene these additional terms as follows:
exH (t) =    (t) F (t) aF
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
 (t) 1
  ! F (t)  !H (t) (2.38)
exF (t) = aHH (t)
H (t) aH + F (t) aF (t)
 (t) 1
  ! F (t)  !H (t)
It is implied that the deviation from the optimal portfolios in a frictionless economy
is linear in the deference between the excepted asset returns across agents.
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Asymmetry related to the center of perceived output growth
Now I assume that the initial levels of precision are the same: vY
k
H (0) = v
Y k
F (0) =
vY
k
(0) ; k 2 fH;Fg. Following the literature such as Gallmeyer and Hollield
(2008), we also assume that local investors are more optimistic than cross-border
investors, that is, Y
H
H (0) > 
Y F
H (0) and 
Y F
F (0) > 
Y F
H (0). The posterior and
prior distribution of investor is beliefs are:
Y
k  N

Y
k
i (0) ; v
Y k (0)

; i 2 fH;Fg ; k 2 fH;Fg (2.39)
Y
k  N

Y
k
i (t) ; v
Y k (t)

; i 2 fH;Fg ; k 2 fH;Fg
where
Y
k
i (t) = v
Y k (t)
24Y ki (0)
vY k (0)
+
R t
0
dY k(u)
Y k(u) 
Y k
2
35 ; (2.40)
vY
k
(t) =
vY
k
i (0)

Y
k
2
vY
k
i (0) t+
 
Y k
2 :
Given that the initial levels of precision are the same, the levels of precision stay
the same over time. The di¤erence in perceived assets returns are given by
 ! F (t)  !H (t) =  (t)T
0BBBBB@
Y
H
(Y H )
2
+vH(0)t

Y
H
F (0)  Y HH (0)

Y
F
(Y F )
2
+vF (0)t

Y
F
F (0)  Y FH (0)

0
1CCCCCA (2.41)
The deviation term of each optimal portfolio is given by
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exH (t) =    (t) F (t) aF
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
 (2.42)0BBBBB@
Y
H
(Y H )
2
+vH(0)t

Y
H
F (0)  Y HH (0)

Y
F
(Y F )
2
+vF (0)t

Y
F
F (0)  Y FH (0)

0
1CCCCCA (2.43)
exF (t) = aHH (t)
H (t) aH + F (t) aF (t)
0BBBBB@
Y
H
(Y H )
2
+vH(0)t

Y
H
F (0)  Y HH (0)

Y
F
(Y F )
2
+vF (0)t

Y
F
F (0)  Y FH (0)

0
1CCCCCA (2.44)
The deviation from the benchmark case is characterized in closed-form, in par-
ticular, in terms of the di¤erences in the initial perceived output growth rates. It
implies that as agents are more optimistic about the domestic output and more
pessimistic about the foreign output, the degree of portfolio home bias increases.
The following proposition summarize the ndings from this subsection.
Proposition 3 1. The degree of portfolio home bias decreases with the di¤erence
in the initial perceived rates of output growth. 2. The degree of portfolio home bias
decreases as t increases, i.e., as agents learn about the outputs.
Asymmetry related to the levels of precision
Now I describe the situation where the initial levels of precision are di¤erent:
vY
k
H (0) 6= vY kF (0) ; k 2 fH;Fg, whereas the initial perceived output growth rates
are the same: Y
H
H (0) = 
Y F
H (0) = 
Y H (0) and Y
F
F (0) = 
Y F
H (0) = 
Y F (0). As
24
before, investors do not know other investors belief nor the accuracy of her/his
own beliefs.
The posterior and prior distribution of investor is beliefs are:
Y
k  N

Y
k
(0) ; vY
k
i (0)

; i 2 fH;Fg ; k 2 fH;Fg
Y
k  N

Y
k
i (t) ; v
Y k
i (t)

; i 2 fH;Fg ; k 2 fH;Fg
where
Y
k
i (t) = v
Y k
i (t)
24Y k (0)
vY
k
i (0)
+
R t
0
dY k(u)
Y k(u) 
Y k
2
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vY
k
i (t) =
vY
k
i (0)

Y
k
2
vY
k
i (0) t+
 
Y k
2 :
Although the initial perceived output growth rates are the same, the perceived
output growth rates can be di¤erent over time. The levels of precision are di¤erent
initially and over time.
The deviation term from the benchmark portfolios are given by
exH (t) =    (t) F (t) aF
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
0BBBBB@
Y
H
(vHH (0) vHF (0))h
(Y H )
2
+vHF (0)t
ih
(Y H )
2
+vHH (0)t
i hY H (0) t  R t
0
dY H(u)
Y H(u)
i
Y
F
(vFH(0) vFF (0))h
(Y F )
2
+vFF (0)t
ih
(Y F )
2
+vFH(0)t
i hY F (0) t  R t
0
dY F (u)
Y F (u)
i
0
1CCCCCA (2.45)
exF (t) = aHH (t)
H (t) aH + F (t) aF (t)
0BBBBB@
Y
H
(vHH (0) vHF (0))h
(Y H )
2
+vHF (0)t
ih
(Y H )
2
+vHH (0)t
i hY H (0) t  R t
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dY H(u)
Y H(u)
i
Y
F
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2
+vFF (0)t
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2
+vFH(0)t
i hY F (0) t  R t
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dY F (u)
Y F (u)
i
0
1CCCCCA (2.46)
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Further assume that vHH (0) = v
F
F (0) = 0, and v
F
H (0) = v
H
F (0) = v (0), then the
deviations become
exH (t) =    (t) F (t) aF
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
0BBBBB@
v(0)wH(t)
(Y H )
2
+v(0)t
 v(0)wF (s)
(Y F )
2
+v(0)t
0
1CCCCCA (2.47)
exF (t) = aHH (t)
H (t) aH + F (t) aF (t)
0BBBBB@
v(0)wH(t)
(Y H )
2
+v(0)t
 v(0)wF (t)
(Y F )
2
+v(0)t
0
1CCCCCA (2.48)
The deviation from the benchmark case now depends on the levels and di¤er-
ences in the initial levels of precision. It implies that portfolio home bias is gener-
ated by agentsover-condence about the domestic output and under-condence
about the foreign output. If cross-border investors have the lower level of precision
on expectation of output growth than local investors, then the optimal portfolio
structure uctuates around the frictionless case. This may increase or decrease the
stock return correlations.
The deviation of optimal portfolio depends on the current realization of output
shocks. For example, in the case of a positive Home shock, the Foreign investor
increases the share of the Home stock, while the Home investor decreases it. This
is because the Foreign investor knows less about the Home production than the
Home investor, so that after observing this positive shock, she/he adjusts portfolio
structure by updating her/his beliefs, while the Home investor keeps the same
portfolio structure. The optimal portfolio approaches to the benchmark portfolio
as time passes by as investors learn about the output growth.
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2.3.3 Portfolio Rebalancing
After the realization of demand and supply shocks, investors adjust their asset
allocation. In the benchmark case where there is no heterogeneity in beliefs, the
Home investors optimal share of the Foreign equity holding is
xS
F
H0 (t) =
aF H (t) (1  aH) + aF F (t) (1  aF )
(aH   aF ) H (t) : (2.49)
Itos Lemma gives
dxS
F
H0 (t) = [Ito term] dt 
aF F (t) (1  aF )
(aH   aF ) H (t) (H   F ) dw
 (t) (2.50)
This tell us in the economy with no demand uncertainty and homogeneous beliefs,
optimal portfolios are deterministic as the second term becomes zero.
Since net capital ows can be dened as changes in the amount of wealth
invested aboard:
CFHF0 (t) = d
h
WH (t)x
SF
H0 (t)
i
= xS
F
H0 (t) dWH (t)| {z }
capital ows due to
the change in wealth
+ WH (t) dx
SF
H0 (t)| {z } .
capital ows due to
the change in optimal portfolio
(2.51)
The volatility of capital ows is solely due to the volatility of wealth generated
from demand shock realization.
In the economy with no heterogeneity in beliefs but with demand uncertainty,
optimal portfolio follows a stochastic path. Now the volatility of capital ows
comes from both the volatility of wealth and the volatility of optimal portfolio
generated from demand shocks.
In the case where investors di¤er in the initial perceived output growth, volatil-
ity of the Home investors optimal share of assets invested abroad is
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F
H (t) = [Ito] dt (2.52)
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dw (t)
It can be shown that the volatility of optimal portfolio is higher than that in the
frictionless case. The second line is the di¤usion term which comes from demand
uncertainty. This part is equal to the di¤usion in the homogeneous beliefs case.
The third line is also the di¤usion related to demand shocks, and this is generated
from the initial heterogeneity in beliefs. The e¤ect of this term gets weaker at
t increases. Finally, the fourth line contains the di¤usion term related to supply
shocks, and this is generated from the initial heterogeneity in beliefs. Since the
direction of uncertainty in this term is independent of that in the second and the
third lines, the volatility of optimal portfolio is higher than that in the frictionless
case.
Capital ows from H to F is given
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CFHF (t) = d
h
WH (t)x
SF
H (t)
i
= xS
F
H (t) dWH (t)| {z }
capital ows due to
the change in wealth
+ WH (t) dx
SF
H (t)| {z }
capital ows due to
the change in optimal portfolio
(2.53)
Now the volatility of capital ows can be decomposed into three parts: capital
ows due to the change in wealth, capital ows due to the change in optimal
portfolio as a result of demand shock realization, and capital ows due to the
change in optimal portfolio as a result of supply shock realization.
In the case where investors di¤er in the levels of precision of initial beliefs,
volatility of the Home investors optimal share of assets invested abroad is given
dxS
F
H (t) = [Ito] dt (2.54)
+
aF (1  aF ) (t) F (t)
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2
+v(0)t
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T
dw (t) :
The interpretation of this equation is similar to the one for equation 2.52.
2.4 Equity Trade Costs
Section 2.4 considers equity trade costs as an alternative source of market fric-
tions and examines how the change in the size of market frictions a¤ect stock
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market correlations. The market friction I consider is a proportional equity trade
cost. Agent in each country incurs a proportional cost  2 (0; 1) on the dividends
received from abroad. The equity trade costs in this model essentially act as a
withholding tax, which can be interpreted metaphorically as a reduced form for
informational costs, transaction costs, di¤erential taxation, etc. This withholding
tax story is realistic because, under the current US tax code, dividend income
earned by foreign corporation is subject to a 30 percent withholding tax. This
withholding tax is not required on dividends paid to domestic shareholders. The
tax withheld from a payment may be recovered by a refund claim, depending upon
a double taxation treaty. For simplicity, a withholding tax is redistributed in a
lump-sum fashion so that there is no cost associated with this tax system. Coeur-
dacier and Guibaud (2009) study the e¤ect of a proportional withholding tax on
stock prices in a one-good, two-asset setting. The rest of the model setting is as
described in Section 2. No arbitrage condition implies that the di¤erence between
investor-specic perceived asset returns is linear in the proportional equity trade
costs:
 ! F (t)  !H (t) = 
0BBBB@
 Y H(t)
SH(t)
Y F (t)
SF (t)
0
1CCCCA (2.55)
Thus, the following ndings hold: 1. Stock market correlations decrease with
the equity trade costs. 2. Stock market correlations decrease in the degree of
consumption home bias. Assuming the logarithmic preferences, the deviation term
of the optimal portfolio from the frictionless case is given by
exH (t) =    (t) F (t) aF
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
0BBBB@
 Y H(t)
SH(t)
Y F (t)
SF (t)
0
1CCCCA , (2.56)
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which implies that the degree of home bias increases with the equity trade costs.
Unlike heterogeneous beliefs, it does not disappear even if t increases, and this
portfolio home bias stays over time.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the e¤ects of heterogeneous beliefs and learning on stock re-
turn comovements and portfolio rebalancing mechanism. The paper develops a
continuous-time general equilibrium model in a two-country, two-asset, two-good
setting, and in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs on output growth. The equi-
librium correlations of stock market returns and optimal portfolios are expressed
in terms of the di¤erences in beliefs. The main ndings are: 1. Stock market corre-
lations decrease with the di¤erences in perceived output growth; and 2. Volatilities
of optimal portfolios and capital ows increase with the di¤erences in perceived
output growth and with the di¤erences in levels of precision of beliefs.
There are two factors that a¤ects the degree of stock return comovements:
demand uncertainty together with consumption home bias; and the presence of
heterogeneity in beliefs.
In a frictionless economy with no demand uncertainty, stock prices across mar-
kets perfectly comove each other under logarithmic preferences (Zapatero, 1995;
Pavlova and Rigobon, 2007). Suppose that there are two countries, Home and For-
eign, in an economy, and each specializes in producing its own goods. A positive
supply shock in the Home country increases the Home stock price. However, due
to relative abundance of the Home goods, the terms of trade deteriorate the Home
currency, which in turn move in favor of the Foreign currency. Hence, the value
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of the Foreign goods rise, thereby providing a boost to the Foreign stock price. It
can be viewed as shock transmission through perfect terms-of-trade adjustment.
Perfect comovements of two stock prices can be also explained by the portfolio re-
balancing channel. A positive supply shock in the Home country increases wealth
of investors who own the Home stock. This wealth expansion increases the de-
mand of the Foreign stock, which results in the increase in the Foreign stock price.
Any deviation from the logarithmic preferences lowers the degree of comovements
because income e¤ects and substitution e¤ects no longer cancel each other.
Why do stock market correlations decrease in the degree of consumption home
bias? With demand uncertainty and consumption home bias, stock price correla-
tion is not equal to one. The Home supply shocks still impact the Foreign stock
market through the terms of trade adjustment but not perfectly as more shocks are
absorbed domestically. Demand uncertainty together with consumption home bias
generates portfolio home bias. When a positive supply shock hits the Home pro-
duction, investorswealth of stock holder of the Home stock in the Home country
increases more than those in the Foreign country. This generates relative "wealth
transfer" from the Foreign country to the Home country, and therefore the demand
for the Home stock rises more than that for the Foreign stock, thereby providing
a surge in the Home stock price.
Why do stock market correlations decrease in the size of market friction? The
way nancial friction impacts the mechanism of the stock comovements is some-
what similar to the demand uncertainty. Financial friction generates portfolio
home bias, which prevents the terms of trade from adjusting to the changes in
relative outputs. It also leads to di¤erent portfolio rebalancing behavior across
markets, resulting in the lower stock price correlation. Any deviation from the
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logarithmic preferences even lowers the correlation.
In addition, heterogeneous beliefs in the model allows us to analyze investors
portfolio rebalancing behavior. Under the situation where the Foreign investors
are less informed about the Home investor, a supply shock in the Home country
have direct wealth e¤ect and indirect portfolio rebalancing e¤ect, and these e¤ects
are in the opposite directions. Wealth e¤ects work just like in a frictionless case
but have more impact on the Home investor due to the portfolio home bias, while
the Foreign investor rebalances their portfolio to a higher extent than the Home
investor. Since the Foreign investors know less about the Home production, they
learn relatively more by observing the realized output and therefore rebalance
more. This helps explaining why cross-border investments tend to be taken out
from the local markets during the crises and why domestic investments are more
stable.
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CHAPTER 3
TRADE COSTS IN GOODS MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL
COMOVEMENTS OF EQUITY MARKETS
This chapter analyzes the e¤ects of trade costs in goods market
on international comovements of equity markets and those on equity
home bias. The chapter develops a continuous-time general equilibrium
model in a two-country, two-asset, and two-good setting where inter-
national trade of goods is costly. I solve for the optimal portfolios and
the equilibrium correlations of cross-country equity returns and analyze
how they change depending on the size of trade costs, the coe¢ cient of
risk aversion, and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
foreign goods. It is found that the cross-country equity return corre-
lations decrease with the size of trade costs. This result is robust to
di¤erent sizes of trade costs and asymmetry related to potential growth
and consumer preferences. It is also found that the size of the trade
costs and other parameter values determine whether trade costs would
generate equity home bias or foreign bias.
3.1 Introduction
Trade costs in goods market are not a negligible market friction as pointed out
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004): international trade costs such as trans-
portation costs and tari¤s are as high as 74 percent of production costs. Roughly
speaking, since trade costs in goods market a¤ect good prices and consumers be-
havior, they should also a¤ect equity prices and their dynamics. However, there is
a broad consensus such that the e¤ects of trade costs on nancial variables would
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depend on the size of trade costs, the elasticity of substitution between goods, and
the coe¢ cient of risk aversion. For instance, trade costs generate equity home bias
if the elasticity of substitution between goods is set to an inverse of the coe¢ cient
of risk aversion, while equity foreign bias is generated if the former exceeds the
latter and if the size of trade costs is less than a certain threshold level. In spite of
these mixed results regarding the e¤ects of trade costs, my nding about the joint
dynamics of equity returns is monotonically decreasing with the size of trade costs
for plausible sets of parameter values.
This chapter ts in two streams of the literature. First, it can be interpreted as
a continuous-time / dynamic extension to the literature that studies the e¤ects of
trade costs on optimal portfolios. There are several important papers that study
the e¤ects of trade costs to explain the equity home bias puzzle: people hold a
disproportionate share of domestic assets. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000, 2007) use a
simple two-period, two-country, two-good model with iceberg-type trade costs and
nd that trade costs in goods markets can explain the equity home bias puzzle.
On the other hand, using a two-period model with plausible sets of parameter
values, Coeurdacier (2009) argues that introducing trade costs in goods markets
is not su¢ cient to explain this equity home bias puzzle. This paper analyzes
the similar topic in a more general set-up in the sense that the model employs
a dynamic continuous-time setting. Trade costs considered in the model are of
iceberg-type and exogenous, following the above papers. In a broader sense, this
chapter can be also seen as an extension to the standard international portfolio
choice literature such as Lucas (1982), Dumas (1992), Uppal (1993), Zapatero
(1995) and Kollmann (2006) in that it considers a wide range of parameter choices
for elasticity of substitution between goods and coe¢ cient of risk aversion.
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The second stream of literature is the international asset pricing models that
study the e¤ect of market frictions on dynamics of asset returns and correlations.
Basak and Gallmeyer (2003) study di¤erential dividend taxation in a standard in-
ternational asset pricing model and nd that the stock return volatility is increased.
Coeurdacier and Guibaud (2008) use a similar continuous-time model with trade
costs in equity markets and show that the stock return correlations decrease with
the size of trade costs. Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) introduce demand shocks into
an otherwise standard model. They nd that the stock return correlations are re-
duced after introduction of e¤ective demand uncertainty. Luo and Visaltanachoti
(2010) extend the model of Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) and analyze the role of
non-tradable. Chapter 2 of this thesis also extends Pavlova and Rigobon (2007)
with an addition of heterogeneous beliefs and learning.
Methodologically, this chapter is related to Devereux and Sutherland (2007)
and Tille and van Wincoop (2010), which provide methods to solve for inter-
national equity portfolios. They take approximations around the non-stochastic
steady-state, whereas Coeurdacier and Guibaud (2008) takes around the size of
market friction. I will take his technique and apply it to my model by taking
approximations around the case with no trade cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, I present a
continuous-time international asset pricing model with a proportional trade costs
in goods market. In Section 3.3, the equilibrium terms of trade, asset return corre-
lations, and optimal portfolios are characterized. Section 3.4 contains simulation
results and interpretation of them. Section 3.5 gives some sensitivity analyses.
Finally, Section 3.6 contains the discussion and concludes.
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3.2 The Model
The paper considers a continuous-time Lucas-type pure-exchange economy with
nite horizon T . The economy consists of two countries: Home and Foreign.
Home variables are denoted with H, and Foreign variables are denoted with F .
The uncertainty in this economy is represented by a ltered probability space
(
;z; fztg ; P ), on which is dened a standard two-dimensional Brownian mo-
tion w (t) =
 
wH (t) ; wF (t)
T
. The Brownian motions wH (t) and wF (t) capture
country-specic production risk in H and F , respectively.
3.2.1 Production
Each country specializes in producing one tradable good. The amount of goods
produced in country i 2 fH;Fg follows a geometric Brownian process:
dY H (t) = Y H (t)
h
Y
H
dt+ Y
H
dwH (t)
i
, and (3.1)
dY F (t) = Y F (t)
h
Y
F
dt+ Y
F
dwF (t)
i
,
where Y
H
and Y
F
denote rates of output growth, and Y
H
and Y
F
denote di¤usion parameters of the output growth. These four parameters are
constant and exogenous. The terms of trade are dened as the price of Foreign
goods relative to the price of the Home goods. By normalizing the price of Home
goods (pH (t) = 1), the terms of trade can be written as p (t)  pF (t) =pH (t), and
follows a geometric Brownian process:
dp (t) = p (t)
h
p (t) dt+ p (t)T dw (t)
i
(3.2)
where p (t) and p (t) are the drift and di¤usion terms of the process and deter-
mined at the equilibrium.
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3.2.2 Investment Opportunities
There are three nancial securities available in this economy: Home equity, Foreign
equity, and risk-free bond. Each equity is a claim on the future endowment of the
country. The prices of Home equity, Foreign equity, and bond are denoted by SH ,
SF , and B, respectively, and all of them are dened in units of the numeraire
goods, i.e., Home goods. The dynamics of asset returns are:
dSH (t) + Y H (t) dt = SH
h
S
H
(t) dt+ S
H
(t)T dw (t)
i
(Home equity)
dSF (t) + p (t)Y F (t) dt = SF
h
S
F
(t) dt+ S
F
(t)T dw (t)
i
(Foreign equity)
dB (t) = B (t)B (t) dt (Risk-free bond)
(3.3)
where S
H
and S
F
are drift terms of asset returns in equity markets, S
H
and
S
F
are di¤usion terms of asset returns, and B is a risk-free rate. All variables for
prices, drifts, and di¤usions are to be determined at the equilibrium. Since bonds
are riskfree, there is no di¤usion associated with the bond price. Because there
are three securities and two sources of uncertainty in a continuous-time dynamic
economy, the market is potentially dynamically complete.
3.2.3 Trade Costs
I assume that goods can be shipped from one country to the other, but this ship-
ment is subject to exogenous iceberg-type costs of trade: a fraction 1
1+
of a unit of
good shipped abroad arrives at its destination. So the price of Home goods faced
by Foreign agent is 1 +  , and the price of Foreign goods faced by Home agent is
(1 + ) p.
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3.2.4 Preferences
Each country is populated by a representative agent who has the standard relative
risk aversion preferences as follows:
Ui (0) = E0
"Z T
0
e t
 
Ci (t)
1 
1  
!
dt
#
; i 2 fH;Fg (3.4)
where  denotes coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, and Ci is the aggregate con-
sumption index for an agent i. When  = 1, the utility function becomes
E0
hR T
0
e t lnCi (t) dt
i
.
Each representative agent consume both goods, and her/his aggregate con-
sumption index Ci is:
Ci (t) =
h
(a)
1
 cHi (t)
  1
 + (1  a) 1 cFi (t)
  1
 
i  
  1
(3.5)
where cHi is the total consumption of Home goods by a representative agent i, c
F
i
is the total consumption of Foreign goods by a representative agent i, a 2 (0; 1)
represents the degree of preference toward Home goods, and the parameter  is
the elasticity of (intratemporal) substitution between Home and Foreign goods. I
will assume for now that  is constant and strictly greater than one. Two goods
are perfect substitutes when  approaches innity and perfect complements when
 = 0. When  = 1, this aggregate consumption index Ci becomes
 
cHi
a  
cFi
1 a
.
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The dynamic budget constraint is given by:
dWH(t)
WH(t)
= xS
H
H (t)

dSH(t)+Y H(t)dt
SH(t)

+ xS
F
H (t)

dSF (t)+p(t)Y F (t)dt
SF (t)

+
h
1  xSHH (t)  xSFH (t)
i
B (t) dt  cHH (t) + (1 + ) p (t) cFH (t) dt (3.6)
dWF (t)
WF (t)
= xS
H
F (t)

dSH(t)+Y H(t)dt
SH(t)

+ xS
F
F (t)

dSF (t)+p(t)Y F (t)dt
SF (t)

+
h
1  xSHF (t)  xSFF (t)
i
B (t) dt  (1 + ) cHF (t) + p (t) cFF (t) dt
whereWi is the size of is wealth in units of Home goods, and x
j
i is a share of wealth
invested on a security j by an agent i. I assume that at t = 0, each agent owns the
entire stock in her/his own country (i.e., WH (0) = SH (0), and WF (0) = SF (0)).
By matching the di¤usion terms of the dynamic budget constraint, the optimal
portfolio for each agent is given:
xi (t) =  (t)
 1 Wi (t) (3.7)
where xi (t) =
h
xS
H
i (t) x
SF
i (t)
iT
is a vector of shares for is wealth invested
on equities,  (t) =
h
S
H
(t) S
F
(t)
i
is a volatility matrix of asset returns,
and Wi is the di¤usion of is wealth.
3.2.5 Equilibrium
The denition of an equilibrium is given as follows:
Denition 4 Given preferences and initial endowments, a competitive equilibrium
is a collection of adapted processes for asset prices, consumption
 
cHi (t) ; c
F
i (t)

,
and asset allocations

xS
H
i (t) ; x
SF
i (t)

, i 2 fH;Fg, such that
cHi (t) ; c
F
i (t) ; x
SH
i (t) ; x
SF
i (t)

is a solution to agent is optimization problem,
and all markets clear for all t 2 [0; T ].
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The market clearing conditions for goods and assets are as follows
cHH (t) + (1 + ) c
H
F (t) = Y
H (t) (Home good)
(1 + ) cFH (t) + c
F
F (t) = Y
F (t) (Foreign good)
WH (t)x
SH
H (t) +WF (t)x
SH
F = S
H (t) (Home stock)
WH (t)x
SF
H (t) +WF (t)x
SF
F (t) = S
F (t) (Foreign stock)
WH (t)

1  xSHH (t)  xSFH (t)

+WF (t)

1  xSHF   xSFF (t)

= 0 (Bond)
(3.8)
To solve for the equilibrium, the following three-step procedures are employed.
First, the individual intratemporal utility maximization gives the intratemporal
allocation of consumption expenditure across goods for each agent. Next, the
individual dynamic utility maximization for each agent gives the intertemporal
allocation of wealth for each agent. On the third step, the intratemporal allocation
of consumption expenditure across agents is given by solving the intratemporal
utility maximization of the world representative agent, appealing to a dynamically
complete market setting.
Each representative agent maximizes the aforementioned dynamic utility func-
tion 3.4 by solving the following intratemporal utility maximization problem:
max
cHi (t);c
F
i (t)
ui (i (t) ; p (t)) = max
cHi (t);c
F
i (t)
Ci (t)
1 
1   (3.9)
subject to H (t) = cHH (t) + (1 + ) p (t) c
F
H (t) for Home agent, and
F (t) = (1 + ) c
H
F (t) + p (t) c
F
F (t) for Foreign agent.
where i is the consumption expenditure for an agent i.
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The rst order conditions give the intratemporal allocation rules across goods:
cHH (t) =
a
a+ (1 + )1  p (t)1  (1  a)H (t) (3.10)
cFH (t) =
(1  a) (1 + )1  p (t)1  
a+ (1 + )1  p (t)1  (1  a)
1
1 + 
1
p (t)
H (t)
for Home agent, and
cHF (t) =
a (1 + )1  
a (1 + )1  + (1  a) p (t)1  
1
1 + 
F (t) (3.11)
cFF (t) =
(1  a) p (t)1  
a (1 + )1  + (1  a) p (t)1  
1
p (t)
F (t)
for Foreign agent.
Now the indirect utility function can be expressed in terms of the consumption
expenditure i:
uH (H (t) ; p (t)) =
h
a+ (1  a) (1 + )1  p (t)1  
i 1 
  1 H(t)1 
1  (Home agent)
uF (F (t) ; p (t)) =
h
a (1 + )1  + (1  a) p (t)1  
i 1 
  1 F (t)1 
1  (Foreign agent)
(3.12)
Using the martingale techniques (Cox and Huang, 1989; Karatzas et al., 1987),
each agents dynamic consumption-portfolio problem can be converted into the
static problem:
max
fi(t)gTt=0
E0
Z T
0
e tui (i (t) ; p (t)) dt

(3.13)
subject to E0
Z T
0
 (t)i (t) dt

 Wi (0)
where  is the state price density process.  can be understood as the
price of a security paying dt at time t, and it follows the dynamics d (t) =
 (t)
h
 B (t) dt   (t)T dw (t)
i
with  (0) = 1, where  denotes the market price
of risk which is dened as
 (t)

 (t)T
 1  ! (t)  B (t) !1  (3.14)
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where
 !
1 is a two-dimensional vector of ones.
The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for optimality of the consumption ex-
penditure stream are:
 (t) =
e t
yH
h
a+ (1  a) (1 + )1  p (t)1  
i 1 
  1
H (t)
  (3.15)
 (t) =
e t
yF
h
a (1 + )1  + (1  a) p (t)1  
i 1 
  1
F (t)
 
where yi > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier such that the budget constraint holds with
equality at the optimum.
Since nancial markets are potentially dynamically complete, the equilibrium
prices of the nancial securities are identical to those in an aggregated represen-
tative agent economy where the representative agent has the following aggregate
intratemporal utility function:
U (H (t) ; F (t) ; p (t))
= max
H(t);F (t)
[uH (H (t) ; p (t)) + u

F (F (t) ; p (t))]
subject to H (t) + F (t) = Y H (t) + p (t)Y F (t) . (3.16)
where the weight  > 0 represents the relative welfare weight of Foreign agent and
is identied as
@uH (t)
@H (t)
= 
@uF (t)
@F (t)
(3.17)
In this economy, since all agents face the same state price density,  is a constant.
The intratemporal allocation of resources is given by:
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H (t) = h (p (t))

Y H (t) + p (t)Y F (t)

(3.18)
F (t) = [1  h (p (t))]

Y H (t) + p (t)Y F (t)

where h (p (t)) =
h
a+ (1  a) (1 + )1  p (t)1  
i 1
  1
1 
0B@
h
a+ (1  a) (1 + )1  p (t)1  
i 1
  1
1 

+
1

h
a (1 + )1  + (1  a) p (t)1  
i 1
  1
1 

1CA
This h (p (t)) can be interpreted as the wealth weight for the Home agent relative
to the Foreign agent.
3.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium
In this section, I give some description of the equilibrium in the neighborhood of the
zero-cost case. Section 3.3.1 gives analytical results for the consumption allocation
rules. Section 3.3.2 examines analytically the terms of trade and dynamics. And
nally, Section 3.3.3 gives asset price dynamics and optimal portfolios.
3.3.1 Consumption
The following proposition is given by combining 3.18 with 3.10.
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Proposition 5 The equilibrium consumption allocations are
cHH (t) =
Home agents allocation across goodsz }| {
a
a+ (1  a) (1 + )1  p (t)1  
Home agents consumption expenditurez }| {
allocation across countriesz }| {
h (p (t))
total outputz }| {
Y H (t) + p (t)Y F (t)

;
cFH (t) =
(1 a)(1+)  p(t)  
a+(1 a)(1+)1  p(t)1  h (p (t))

Y H (t) + p (t)Y F (t)

;
cHF (t) =
a(1+)  
a(1+)1  +(1 a)p(t)1  [1  h (p (t))]

Y H (t) + p (t)Y F (t)

;
cFF (t) =
(1 a)p(t)  
a(1+)1  +(1 a)p(t)1  [1  h (p (t))]

Y H (t) + p (t)Y F (t)

.
(3.19)
Each of these allocation rules has three components. The rst component
represents how each agent allocates her/his consumption expenditure across goods;
the second is for resource allocation across countries; and the third component
corresponds to the total output. When  > 0, the amounts of consumption of
imported goods, namely cFH and c
H
F , are reduced, resulting in the consumption
home bias.
3.3.2 Terms of Trade
Following Coeurdacier and Guibaud (2008), I take approximations in the size of
trade costs around the no-cost case. The terms of trade p can be derived from
the market clearing condition for goods (3.8) and the equilibrium consumption
allocations (3.19). The detailed derivation of the terms of trade is given in the
Appendix B.
Proposition 6 To the rst order, the terms of trade p is given by:
p (t) =
 
1 + 
   1
 
1   1
1 + 
1

!
1  a
a
Y H (t)
Y F (t)
 1
 
+ o () . (3.20)
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When there is no cost associated with international trade of goods ( = 0), the
terms of trade reect the relative output ratio regardless of the relative wealth size
 or the risk aversion coe¢ cient . If Y H increases relative to Y F , the terms of
trade p, i.e., the relative prices of Foreign goods goes up because the Home goods
become more abundant than the Foreign goods. With a greater  , the terms of
trade reects the change in the relative output ratio to a less extent because agents
will adjust their consumption bundles more easily in response to observed shocks.
The rst-order e¤ect of trade costs depends on the values of  , , and . At
the symmetric equilibrium, there is no rst-order e¤ect of  on the terms of trade
as  = 1. There is also no rst-order e¤ect on the terms of trade if the elasticity of
substitution between goods is one ( = 1). Otherwise,  a¤ects p, but the direction
of the e¤ects varies. In the case where the elasticity of substitution between goods
is greater than unity (that is,  > 1; where goods are more substitutable than
 = 1) and the weight is more on the Home agent ( < 1), the e¤ect of  on p is
positive, which means that the relative price of Foreign goods increases with the
size of trade costs. On the other hand, where the weight is more on the Foreign
agent ( > 1), the e¤ect of  on p is positive, which means that the relative price of
Foreign goods decreases with the size of trade costs. That is,  increases the price
of goods imported from a smaller country to a larger country, while  decreases
the price of goods imported from a larger country to a smaller country. From a
viewpoint of a larger country, imports become more expensive with  , while they
become less expensive for a smaller country.
The intuition is the following: Consider the case where Home is greater than
Foreign in wealth ( < 1) and two goods are more substitutable than unity ( > 1).
When trade costs are reduced, both countries start to consume more of imported
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goods. But due to the di¤erence in size, an increase in Home agents consumption
of Foreign goods is greater than that in Foreign agents consumption of Home
goods. This asymmetric reaction pushes up the price of Foreign goods relative
to Home goods. On the other hand, when two goods are less substitutable than
unity, then the increased wealth due to reduced trade costs will be spent more
on domestic goods and less on imported goods. Since the Home country is larger
in size, the impact of the change in her/his behavior exceeds that for the Foreign
agent. Therefore, the price of Foreign goods relative to Home goes down.
Next, I consider the second-order approximation of the terms of trade as in the
following proposition.
Proposition 7 Second-order approximation for p is:
p (t) =
 
1 + 
   1
 
1   1
1 + 
1

!
1  a
a
Y H (t)
Y F (t)
 1
 
(3.21)
+
 2
2
(   1) 1  
1

1 + 
1

"
1  1  
1

1 + 
1


   1
 
2#
1  a
a
Y H (t)
Y F (t)
 1
 
+ 2

1

   
 
   1
 
1   1
1 + 
1

!2  1 a
a
 2
 

Y H(t)
Y F (t)
 2  
 
1 +
 
1 a
a
 1
 

Y H(t)
Y F (t)
 1  
 
+ 2

1

   

   1
 
26666664
1
1+
1

( 1 aa )
2
 

Y H (t)
Y F (t)
 2  
 
1+( 1 aa )
1
 

Y H (t)
Y F (t)
 1  
 
  
1

1+
1

( 1 aa )
1
 

Y H (t)
Y F (t)
 1
 
1+( 1 aa )
1
 

Y H (t)
Y F (t)
 1  
 
37777775
+o
 
 2

.
The rst line is the same as the rst-order approximation for p. The signs and
impacts of the second-order e¤ects of trade costs (lines 2, 3 and 4) are time-variant
and depend on the current relative output ratio as well as the values of  , , and
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. With  = 1, there is no e¤ect of  on p just like in the rst-order e¤ect. When
 = 1, the second and third lines become zero, while the fourth line remains. When
1

=  , the expression of p becomes a simple reection of the relative output ratio.
Finally, at the symmetric equilibrium, the terms of trade are reduced to the one
in the no-cost case.
Proposition 8 First- and second-order approximation of terms of trade di¤usion
coe¢ cient p (t) are:
p (t) =
Y
H   Y F
 
+ o () (3.22)
p (t) = f (t) p (t) 1

1  a
a
Y H (t)
Y F (t)
 1
 Y
H   Y F
 
+ o
 
 2

(3.23)
where f (t) =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 +    1
 
1 
1

1+
1

  2
2
(   1) 1 
1

1+
1

+ 
2
2
(   1)

  1
 
1 
1

1+
1

2
  2

1

   

  1
 
2
2  +p0(t)b(t) 1
[1+p0(t)b(t) 1]
2 p0 (t) b (t)
 1

1 
1

1+
1

2
+ 2

1

   

  1
 
2664

1

1+
1

1+ p0(t)b(t)
 1
[1+p0(t)b(t) 1]
2
  1
1+
1

2  +p0(t)b(t) 1
[1+p0(t)b(t) 1]
2 p0 (t) b (t)
 1
3775
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
The di¤usions of the terms of trade are time-invariant up to rst order, while
they depend on the relative output ratio in the second order. The second-order
will be ine¤ective if  = 1. When  = 1, the second and third lines of f disappear,
while the fourth line remains. At the symmetric equilibrium, the di¤usion becomes
p (t) =

1 +  2
1
4

1

   

(1 +  )
   1
 

Y
H   Y F
 
+ o
 
 2

, (3.24)
Given the terms of trade di¤usion, the terms of trade volatilities are given by
kp (t)k =
h
p (t)T p (t)
i 1
2
. With  = 1, the volatility is kp (t)k =
Y H   Y F,
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which means that the volatility of terms of trade purely comes from the volatil-
ities of outputs, and there is no e¤ect of trade costs whatsoever as dk
p(t)k
d
= 0.
When  > 1,  a¤ects the terms of trade volatility. For example, at the symmetric
equilibrium, the terms of trade volatility becomes
kp (t)k =

1  
2
4

   1


(1 +  )
   1
 
 Y
H   Y F
 
 : (3.25)
The e¤ect of  on the volatility is
d kp (t)k
d
=

2

1

   

(1 +  )
   1
 
Y
H   Y F
 
 . (3.26)
This means that  makes the terms of trade less volatile if  > 1

, which is assumed
widely in the related literature. The intuition is the following: With no trade costs,
the terms of trade purely reect the change in the relative output ratio. On the
other hand, in present of trade costs, the terms of trade does not reect the change
in outputs as much as the benchmark no-cost case. This happens when consumers
can easily substitute one type of goods to the other, and "easily" means  > 1

.
3.3.3 Asset Returns, Wealth Processes, and Optimal Port-
folios
The two equity prices SHand SF and their dynamics can be derived by the following
lemmas. The derivations of these lemma are given in Appendix C.
Lemma 9 Home and Foreign equity prices can be written as
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SH (t) = Et
Z T
t
 (s)
 (t)
Y H (s) ds

, (3.27)
SF (t) = Et
Z T
t
 (s)
 (t)
p (s)Y F (s) ds

.
Lemma 10 Home and Foreign equity prices di¤usions are given
S
H
(t) =  (t) + Y
H
+
Et
hR T
t
 (s)Y H (s) Dt(s)
(s)
ds
i
Et
hR T
t
 (s)Y H (s) ds
i , (3.28)
S
H
(t) =  (t) + Y
F
+
Et
hR T
t
 (s)Y F (s) p (s)

Dt(s)
(s)
+ Dtp(s)
p(s)

ds
i
Et
hR T
t
 (s)Y F (s) p (s) ds
i .
Lemma 11 The correlation of equity returns is
SHSF (t) =
S
HSF (t)SH (t)SF (t) (3.29)
The equity prices are derived in a typical way: the sum of discounted future
dividend ows. The di¤usion coe¢ cients of equity prices consist of two parts: one
represents the current market price of risks and the di¤usion of their production,
while the other is the same for the future. Assuming that there is systematic
asymmetry between the Home and Foreign, the di¤usion term that comes from
the future production would be the same for the Home and Foreign. Therefore,
the degree of international comovements of stock prices depends on the degree of
comovements between the current levels of Y H and pY F .
The two wealth processes WH and WF and their dynamics are characterized
by the following lemmas. The derivations are given in Appendix C.
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Lemma 12 Home and Foreign wealth processes can be written as
WH (t) = Et
Z T
t
 (s)
 (t)
H (s) ds

(3.30)
WF (t) = Et
Z T
t
 (s)
 (t)
F (s) ds

Lemma 13 Home and Foreign wealth process di¤usions are given
WH (t) =  (t) +
Et
hR T
t
 (s)H (s)

DtH(s)
H(s)
+ Dt(s)
(s)

ds
i
Et
hR T
t
 (s)H (s) ds
i (3.31)
WF (t) =  (t) +
Et
hR T
t
 (s)F (s)

DtF (s)
F (s)
+ Dt(s)
(s)

ds
i
Et
hR T
t
 (s)F (s) ds
i
Finally, the optimal portfolios are given as in 3.7
xH (t) =  (t)
 1 WH (t) , (3.32)
xF (t) =  (t)
 1 WF (t) ,
and, given Y H (t) ; Y F (t) ; Y
H
; Y
F
;Y
H
;Y
F
; a and , the degree of equity home
bias is dened as
Bias = xH (t)  xF (t) (3.33)
=  (t) 1
 
WH (t)  WF (t)
=  (t) 1
0BB@
Et
hR T
t (s)H(s)

DtH (s)
H (s)
+
Dt(s)
(s)

ds
i
Et[
R T
t (s)H(s)ds]
 Et
hR T
t (s)F (s)

DtF (s)
F (s)
+
Dt(s)
(s)

ds
i
Et[
R T
t (s)F (s)ds]
1CCA
If the rst component of this measure is positive (or equivalently, the second com-
ponent is negative), equity home bias exists. Similarly, if the rst component is
negative, equity foreign bias exists.
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3.4 Simulation Results
Analytical results are not available for equity price dynamics or optimal portfolios
as they cannot be expressed in closed-form except for some special cases. This
section provides Monte Carlo simulation results for the e¤ects of trade costs in
goods market on equity return volatilities, terms of trade volatilities, equity return
correlations, and degree of equity biases.
Some obvious cases are when the elasticity of substitution between goods  
is set to unity. With  = 1, the individual utility functions stand for a simple
logarithmic-type preference, so that income and substitution e¤ects cancel out
each other in response to supply shocks. In this case, the terms of trade perfectly
reect the relative output ratio, and thus, two equity prices comove perfectly,
which makes the asset return volatility matrix invertible. The optimal portfolio
is of course indeterminate, and furthermore, trade costs in goods market have no
e¤ect on nancial variables. The asset return correlations are one for any levels of
trade costs.
Once the elasticity of substitution between goods  deviates from unity, trade
costs become e¤ective on the asset price dynamics. The parameter values used in
these numerical examples are as follows: a = 0:5,  = 0:04, Y
H
= Y
F
= 0:03,
Y
H
= [0:15 0:05]T , Y
F
= [0:05 0:15]T , T = 5, n = 12. The number of
iterations are 10,000.
I consider the case when the elasticity of substitution between goods  is greater
than the inverse of the risk aversion coe¢ cient. Following Coeurdacier (2009), the
elasticity of substitution between goods is set to  = 5, and the coe¢ cient of risk
aversion is set to  = 2. The basic results of simulation is shown on Figures 3.1-
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3.10. The Foreign stock return volatility is increasing with the size of trade costs
as in Figure 3.1. The reason for this increasing volatility is explained in Figure
3.2, which shows how the Foreign equity returns are sensitive to output shocks
in each country. The di¤usion values are decreasing with the size of trade costs
with respect to Home shocks and increasing with respect to Foreign shocks. This
implies that the larger the trade barriers are, the more sensitive to domestic shocks
the equity returns become.
Now, the question is: why do equity returns become more sensitive to domestic
shocks in presence of trade barriers? The key is to understand how the terms of
trade react to these shocks. Figure 3.3 tells us that the terms of trade volatility
decreases with the size of trade costs up to a certain threshold level , becomes
zero at , and increases with the size of trade costs for any trade costs higher than
. The di¤usions of the terms of trade are shown in Figure 3.4. According to this
gure, the terms of trade is positively associated with Home shocks and negatively
with Foreign shocks when trade costs are small, while all associations are reversed
when trade costs are above the threshold level.
The equilibrium covariance between equity returns and the terms of trade is
shown in Figure 3.5 for various levels of trade costs. The covariance is negative
when the trade costs are below the threshold level  and positive if the trade costs
are above . This implies that in presence of small trade barriers, equities provide
less returns when the price of goods is high. Similarly, in presence of large trade
barriers, equities provide more returns when the price of goods is high.
Such patterns of equity returns and the terms of trade generate equity biases
as in Figures 3.6 and 3.7. Figure 3.6 shows the shares of foreign equity in domestic
wealth and in foreign wealth. When the size of trade costs is below the threshold
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level , the share of foreign equity in domestic wealth is more than the share in
foreign wealth, meaning that investors prefer equities abroad (i.e., equity foreign
bias). Foreign agent prefers Home equity to Foreign equity because the Foreign
equity provides less returns when the price of Foreign goods (which she/he prefers
to consume) is high. Similarly, Home agent prefers Foreign equity because Home
equity provides less returns when the price of Home goods is high. When the size
of trade costs is above , the share of foreign equity in foreign wealth is more than
the share in domestic wealth. Foreign agent prefers Foreign equity to Home equity
because now the Foreign equity provides more returns when the price of Foreign
goods is high. Since the degree of equity biases is dened as the di¤erence in shares
of Home equity in Home wealth and in Foreign wealth, the degree of equity bias is
negative when trade barriers are large and positive when trade barriers are small
(Figure 3.7).
The overall story goes as follows: When there is no trade cost, the terms of trade
act as a close refection of the relative output as discussed in the previous section.
Consumers can substitute goods one from the other without any costs associated
with international trade of goods. When a permanent positive shock hits the Home
production, the relative price of Foreign goods increase due to abundance of Home
goods (Figure 3.8). Each agents portfolio is the same as the market portfolio,
so there is no equity bias. Both agents shift their consumption bundle towards
Home goods because Home goods are now relatively cheaper. Agents also shift
their portfolio towards Home equity because the permanent shock increases the
expected returns of Home equity (Figure 3.9). Since both agents change their
portfolio in the exact same way, no equity bias is generated after the shock.
In presence of small trade costs, the terms of trade reect the output ratio
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to a less extent, i.e., the degree of reection goes down with the size of trade
costs as they alleviate the interaction between the terms of trade and the output
ratio. Consumers would still substitute from one goods to the other goods, but
they are subject to trade costs for consumption of imported goods. In terms of
optimal portfolios, equity foreign bias is generated because the equilibrium covari-
ance between the Foreign asset returns and the relative prices of Foreign goods
are negative. Suppose that both agents held the same market portfolio as in the
zero-cost case, the Home agent was to be more subjective to the Home shock than
the Foreign agent since the relative price of Foreign goods would not be a¤ected as
much to reect the output ratio. This means that the Home agent could improve
her/his risk sharing by make herself/himself more subjective to Foreign shocks,
that is to say, by holding more Foreign equity. Similarly, the Foreign agent would
better o¤ in terms of risk sharing by holding more Home equity than the market
portfolio. As a results, equity foreign bias is generated, and this result holds as
long as the size of trade costs is less than a certain threshold level .
When the size of trade costs is exactly at the threshold level , the terms of
trade do not at all reect the output ratio. A positive supply shock in Home equity
puts upward pressure on the terms of trade, but at the same time, the substitution
e¤ects towards Home goods put the opposite pressure. At this threshold level of
trade costs, these two pressures exactly cancel out each other. Since the equilibrium
covariances between the terms of trade and either equity prices are zero, no equity
bias is generated, that is, each agent holds the market portfolio.
When the size of trade costs is above the threshold level , the terms of trade
move in a way such that the more abundant the goods are, the more expensive
they become. For example, a positive supply shock in Home equity increases
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the wealth of both Home and Foreign agents. Since the trade costs are so high,
consumers do not shift their consumption towards imports, and rather consume
more of domestically produced goods. Since this particular shock is a positive shock
on Home equity, the terms of trade move in favor of Home goods. The equilibrium
covariances between the Foreign equity returns and the relative prices of Foreign
goods are now positive. Suppose that both agents held the market portfolio, the
Home agent was to be more subjective to Foreign shocks than the Foreign agents as
a negative supply shock on Foreign production increase the relative price of Home
goods, which the Home agent can consume without incurring high trade costs.
This means that the Home agent could improve her/his risk sharing by holding
more of the Home equity. As a results, equity home bias is generated, and this
result holds as long as the size of trade costs is above the threshold level . The
equilibrium correlations decreases with the size of trade costs.
Finally, the equilibrium correlations between equity returns decrease with the
size of trade costs, in spite of the mixed e¤ects of trade costs on the terms of trade
volatility and optimal portfolios (Figure 3.10). This is because the equity return
volatility is increasing in the size of trade costs (Figure 3.1) as trade costs make
equity returns more sensitive to domestic shocks (Figure 3.2). Another reason is
that the equilibrium covariances between equity returns are decreasing in the size
of trade costs due to lowered adjustability of the terms of trade (Figure 3.11).
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
These ndings are robust to di¤erent levels of the elasticity of substitution between
goods and the coe¢ cient of risk aversion. The simulation results are shown in
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Figures 3.12-3.19.
First, Figure 3.12 gives the correlations between equity returns as a function of
trade costs and the elasticity of substitution between goods. When the elasticity
of substitution between goods is one, as aforementioned before, the equilibrium
correlations between equity returns are one no matter what the size of the trade
costs is. As soon as the elasticity deviates from one, the correlations become a de-
creasing function of the size of the trade costs, which is consistent with our results.
It can be also seen on the gure that the e¤ects of trade costs on the correlations
increase with the elasticity of substitutions. In other words, at some xed level of
trade costs, the correlations are decreasing in the elasticity of substitution. This
is because trade costs prevents consumers from substituting their consumption of
one goods from the other goods. With high trade costs and a large elasticity, the
incentive to shift consumption bundles are high, but the shift will not be fully
taken place due to the trade costs, which lower the equilibrium correlations of
equity returns.
Figure 3.13 shows the correlations between equity returns as a function of
trade costs and the coe¢ cient of risk aversion. It is found that at any levels of the
coe¢ cient of risk aversion, the correlations are decreasing with the size of trade
costs, which is again consistent with our results.
Do parameter choices matter in the formation of portfolio structures? Figures
3.14 and 3.16 contain the answer to this question. Figure 3.14 shows the shares of
foreign equity in domestic wealth as a function of trade costs and the elasticity of
substitution between goods, holding the risk aversion coe¢ cient constant. When
the elasticity is equal to one, the optimal portfolio is indeterminate because as
seen earlier two equity returns perfectly comove each other. When the elasticity is
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greater than one but less than the threshold level , the Home agent holds more
foreign equity and less domestic equity, i.e., equity foreign bias. Finally when the
elasticity is greater than the threshold level , her/his portfolio is biased toward
domestic equity. These ndings are the same as the one we discussed earlier. It
can be also seen on this gure that the threshold level  of trade costs becomes
lower as the elasticity of substitution between goods are higher. The share of
foreign equity in domestic wealth is decreasing in the elasticity at any levels of
trade costs. The e¤ects of the elasticity of substitution seem to be larger with
lager trade costs, which also supports one of the earlier ndings: agents want to
hold more of foreign equity when the price of foreign goods is high. The intuition
is as follows: for a low elasticity of substitution, an agent cares a lot about which
goods to consume, and thus, she/he holds portfolio whose returns are high when
the foreign goods price is high. (The desire for not loosing consumption of foreign
goods is higher for a lower elasticity of substitution.) On the other hand, for a high
elasticity of substitution, an agent cares little about which goods to consume since
her/his consumption bundle can be relatively easily shift towards either goods in
response to realization of goods. This allows equity returns and prices to move to
the opposite directions, resulting in equity home bias.
The opposite side of the foreign equity market can be seen on Figure 3.15
which show the shares of foreign equity in foreign wealth as a function of trade
costs and the elasticity of substitution between goods. Finally, the degree of equity
home bias is shown on Figure 3.16 as a function of trade costs and the elasticity
of substitution. Equity biases are generated toward domestic or foreign equities
depending on the size of trade costs and the choice of elasticity of substitution.
The conditions for a set of parameter values that gives a negative association
58
between the equilibrium correlations and the size of trade costs are summarized in
Figure 3.20. If a set of parameter values of the elasticity of substitution and the risk
aversion coe¢ cient falls into the areas denoted by "negative", located at top-right
and bottom-left, then the equilibrium correlations between equity returns decrease
with the size of trade costs. If a set of parameters are right on the boarder, i.e.,
 = 1 or  = 1

, then trade costs have no impact on the equilibrium correlations.
Otherwise, the equilibrium correlations increase with the size of trade costs.
The relationships between parameter values and the degree of equity biases can
be summarized as follows: If  = 1, optimal portfolios are indeterminate as the
equilibrium correlations between equity prices is one. If  6= 1, then the value of 
determines whether equity biases are generated. If  > 1, then trade costs generate
equity foreign bias; if  = 1, then trade costs has no impacts on optimal portfolios;
and otherwise, trade costs generate equity home bias. These relationships hold
only for small trade barriers. For large trade barriers, the association could be
reversed depending on the threshold levels of trade costs.
Another robustness checks conducted here is regarding an asymmetric setting.
Figures 3.21-3.24 show how the related variables are a¤ected by the relative wealth
size. In Section 3.3.2, it was suggested that the equal weights for the Home and For-
eign agents ( = 1) simplies the terms of trade dramatically. It might be the case
that any asymmetry could change my results about the equilibrium correlations
and equity home biases. However, all of these variables do not change qualitatively,
and thus, it can be suggested that our ndings are robust to asymmetric settings.
59
3.6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the mechanism of international comovements across imper-
fectly integrated markets. The chapter develops a continuous-time general equilib-
rium model in a two-country, two-asset, and two-good setting where international
trade of goods are costly. The equilibrium correlations of two equity returns are
expressed in terms of the size of trade costs.
It is found that the degree of equity bias depends on the size of trade costs,
the elasticity of substitution between goods, and the coe¢ cient of risk aversion.
When the equilibrium covariances between equity returns and the terms of trade
is negative, equity foreign bias exists, while when it is positive, equity home bias
exists. This results is consistent with the ndings by Coeurdacier (2009), and this
chapter shows that his ndings hold in a continuous-time dynamic setting. In
spite of these parameter-dependent results in portfolio structures, the equilibrium
correlations between equity returns are monotonically decreasing in the size of
trade costs for a plausible set of parameter values. This is because: 1. Trade
costs make equity returns sensitive to domestic shocks, and 2. The equilibrium
covariance between equity returns decreases with the size of trade costs due to
lowered adjustability of the terms of trade.
All the results derived in this chapter are qualitative, and any potential empir-
ical implications are left for future research.
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Figure 3.1: Equity return volatility as a function of trade costs.
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Figure 3.2: Di¤usion coe¢ cients of equity returns as a function of trade costs
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Figure 3.3: Terms of trade volatility as a function of trade costs
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Figure 3.4: Di¤usion coe¢ cients of the terms of trade as a function of trade costs
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium covariance between equity returns and the terms of trade
as a function of trade costs.
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Figure 3.6: Shares of foreign equity
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Figure 3.7: Degree of equity home bias as a function of trade costs.
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Figure 3.8: Change in the terms of trade after a positive shock to Home production.
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Figure 3.9: Change in shares of foreign equity in domestic asset after a positive
shock to Home production.
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Figure 3.10: Cross-country equity return correlations as a function of trade costs.
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Figure 3.11: Equilibrium covariance between domestic and foreign equity returns
as a funciton of trade costs.
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Figure 3.12: Cross-country equity return correlations as a function of  and  
when  = 2.
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Figure 3.13: Cross-country return correlations as a function of  and  when  = 5.
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Figure 3.14: Share of foreign equity in domestic wealth as a function of  and  
when  = 2.
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Figure 3.15: Share of foreign equity in foreign wealth as a function of  and  
when  = 2.
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Figure 3.16: Degree of equity home bias as a function of  and  when  = 2.
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Figure 3.17: Share of foreign equity in domestic wealth as a function of  and 
when  = 5.
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Figure 3.18: Share of foreign equity in foreign wealth as a function of  and  when
 = 5.
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Figure 3.19: Degree of equity home bias as a function of  and  when  = 5.
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Figure 3.20: Conditions for a negative association between the equilibrium corre-
lations and the size of trade costs.
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Figure 3.21: Equity return volatility as a function of trade costs.
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Figure 3.22: Cross-country equity return correlations as a function of trade costs.
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Figure 3.23: Terms of trade volatility as a function of trade costs.
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Figure 3.24: Shares of foreign equity in domestic asset.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION ON INTERNATIONAL COMOVEMENTS OF
STOCK MARKETS
This chapter analyzes the e¤ects of nancial integration on the ex-
tent of stock market synchronization. At a theoretical level, nancial
integration has an ambiguous impact on stock market synchroniza-
tion. I characterize synchronization among 24 countries over the period
1980-2003. A country-pair panel instrumental variables framework is
employed to explain time-varying correlations among national stock re-
turns, by utilizing the Fitzgerald (2008) dataset on trade costs. It is
found that nancial integration driven by reduction of trade costs leads
to a higher degree of synchronization across stock markets.
4.1 Introduction
In the last three decades, we have observed a rapid increase in international -
nancial integration. Figure 4.1 depicts a recent surge in the measure of nancial
integration since 1980 for 24 advanced and emerging market economies. Finan-
cial integration is measured by the amounts of assets and liabilities as a ratio to
GDP, and the gure shows the median value for each year. We have also witnessed
evidence of rising comovements of stock returns across markets. The trend of in-
creasing correlations between stock returns has been pointed out by many related
works such as Yang et al., 2006.
At a theoretical level, nancial integration has both positive and negative im-
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pacts on stock market synchronization. Financial integration could increase the
degree of asset return comovements through the transmission of country-specic
shocks (contagion). Under completely segmented nancial markets, country-
specic shocks a¤ect only domestic investors since they do not hold foreign stocks.
On the other hand, when nancial markets are somewhat integrated, country-
specic shocks will be transmitted through wealth e¤ects. For example, a positive
productivity shock in one country increases relative wealth of stock holders in the
world. Increasing wealth in turn shifts up their demand for stocks in other coun-
tries, thereby inducing return comovements, regardless of the evolution of market
fundamentals. Financial integration may also lead to sectoral specialization of
production through the reallocation of capital. It alleviates country-specic shock
transmission and simultaneous impacts of sector-specic shocks that a¤ect one par-
ticular industry in all countries. Overall impact of increasing nancial integration
is therefore ambiguous.
Understanding stock return comovements is an essential component of asset
management. The modern portfolio theory tells us that investors can reduce their
exposure to risk by holding a combination of weakly correlated assets. When
two stock returns are uncorrelated, for instance, agents can reduce the volatility
of portfolio by investing in both stocks. On the other hand, when two stock
returns are highly and positively correlated, it becomes more di¢ cult to diversify
their portfolio risks. Furthermore, the extent of stock market synchronization has
an important policy implication since it indicates to what degree external shocks
could be transmitted into the domestic nancial market. Before implementing new
government policies (e.g. lowering foreign income tax), one should assess how such
policy changes a¤ect vulnerability of the domestic nancial market to external
shocks.
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Integration reduces the cost of capital and attracts foreign investors to local
markets appealing to their better diversication benets. However, if the degree
of synchronization goes up as a result of increasing foreign participation, the di-
versication benets would become smaller. This paper examines how integration
and synchronization are linked together, that is, how nancial integration a¤ect
comovements of stock returns. To this aim, I look at how nancial integration is
associated with the degree of comovements. The empirical investigation is con-
ducted on 24 advanced and emerging market economies 1980 to 2003. The degree
of synchronization is measured by the correlations between weekly national stock
returns, computed over one-year period. The dynamic panel instrumental variables
framework is used to control for a potential endogeneity problem associated with
nancial integration by utilizing the dataset on trade costs in Fitzgerald (2008).
It is found that nancial integration stemming from reduction of trade costs is
followed by a higher degree of synchronization across stock markets.
This chapter adds to the literature in the following ways. First, my analysis is
more comprehensive than the previous studies as my dataset covers both advanced
and emerging market economies. Most existing works use bilateral nancial ow
data to measure strength of nancial linkages between two countries. However,
such data is available only for a small number of countries with a short time
dimension. I get around this issue by following Walti (2008) in constructing an
alternative measure of nancial integration between two countries. Walti (2008)
uses the logarithm of the product of two countriesmeasures of nancial openness
taken from the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) dataset of nancial assets and
liabilities, and therefore the coverage is wide in both cross-sectional and time-series
dimensions. Second, I employ a country-pair time-varying instrumental variables
method by utilizing the dataset of Fitzgerald (2008). Fitzgeral (2008) reports
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exogenous and time-varying bilateral trade costs over the period 1980-2003 for 24
advanced and emerging market economies. The use of this trade cost dataset as
instruments allows the models to reect a causal e¤ect of nancial integration on
stock market synchronization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 reviews related litera-
ture on the impacts of globalization on comovements; Section 4.3 provides a brief
description of the data and the econometric specications; Section 4.4 presents re-
gression results showing the relationship between the stock return correlations and
the measures of nancial integration, and checks whether the results are robust;
and nally, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
Several aspects of nancial integration have been identied as drivers of stock
market synchronization. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) nd that liberalized equity
markets show a higher degree of comovements with world indices. They nd that
stock return correlations and market betas increase after liberalization of capital
account by comparing them for pre- and post-liberalization. Along the same line,
Goetzman et al. (2005) and Quinn and Voth (2008) use a long-run dataset on cap-
ital account regulations over 100 years and nd evidence of a positive relationship
between the level of capital account openness and stock return correlations.
Bilateral nancial and trade intensity are also found to be key drivers of stock
market synchronization. Forbes and Chinn (2004) compare the importance of di-
rect trade linkages with that of bilateral nancial ows and conclude that trade
ows are signicant determinants of the e¤ect of large stock markets on other -
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nancial markets. Beine and Candelon (2007) provide evidence for a positive impact
of both nancial and trade integration on the degree of cross-country stock mar-
ket correlations among 25 developing countries. Morana (2008) focus on G-7 and
show that economic integration increases international stock market comovements
through the common response of stock markets to global economic shocks, while
nancial integration would operate through nancial shocks spillover.
In addition to equity market liberalization and nancial and trade intensity, a
number of factors are identied as robust determinants of international synchro-
nization of equity returns. Dellas and Hess (2005) examine a cross section of both
industrial and emerging market economies and show that stock market synchro-
nization increases with the liquidity of equity markets and greater nancial depth.
Fratzscher (2002) shows that exchange rate volatility negatively impacts stock mar-
ket comovements. Walti (2008) studies the impact of monetary integration on stock
market synchronization and nd that the adoption of a single currency increases
correlation. Tavares (2009) documents that bilateral trade intensity increases the
correlation of returns, while real exchange rate volatility and the asymmetry of
output growth decrease it. Roll (1992) and Dutt and Mihov (2005) document the
role of industrial structure on stock market comovements and conclude that the
similarity in industry composition lead stock markets to comove more than stock
markets with a di¤erent industry composition. Finally, Bartoram, Gri¢ n, and
Ng (2009) conclude that the stock return correlations depend on the international
ownership.
Beine and Candelon (2007) suggest that these divergent results may be due to
the high degree of heterogeneity when industrial countries and developing countries
are analyzed together. I challenge this issue by properly controlling for country-
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specic characteristics and international trends that a¤ect all sample countries.
In a broader sense, this chapter is related to the literature that has explored
the costs and benets of integration. For instance, Sachs and Warner (1995) and
Wacziarg and Welch (2008) nd that trade openness promotes economic growth.
Although empirical evidence is less clear for the e¤ect of nancial integration (see
for instance the survey paper by Kose et al., 2009), capital account liberalization is
identied as an important source of economic growth (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003).
4.3 Data and Methodology
There are various approaches to measure international stock market comovements.
One simple way is to look at the pairwise correlations between stock returns. This
approach is widely used to assess the joint behavior of the two stock markets
(Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Dellas and Hess, 2005; Beine and Candelon, 2007;
Walti, 2008). However, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) point out that the correlation
coe¢ cients are biased upwards when markets become more volatile and conclude
that there was virtually no increase in unconditional correlation coe¢ cients. They
suggest that the correlations should be adjusted by the relative increase in the
variance of returns:
CORRFRi;j;t =
CORRrealizedi;j;tr
1 + vi;j;t
h
1   CORRrealizedi;j;t 2i (4.1)
where CORRFRi;j;t is the volatility-corrected correlation coe¢ cient for countries i
and j at time t, CORRrealizedi;j;t is the realized correlations, and vi;j;t is the relative
increase in the variance of the returns dened by
vi;j;t =
max(i;t; j;t)
min(i;t; j;t)
  1
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where i;t denotes the variance of the returns for country i at time t. Since these
correlation coe¢ cients cannot be normally distributed, I adapt a Fisher-Z transfor-
mation of the dependent variable following Otto et al. (2001), Beine and Candelon
(2007), and Walti (2008):
CORRi;j;t = ln
 
1 + CORRFRi;j;t
1  CORRFRi;j;t
!
(4.2)
This CORRi;j;t is the variable used in my regression analysis. In the sensitivity
analysis, I also use the uncorrected corrections to make sure that the results do
not solely depend on measures of stock return correlations.
Our sample covers 24 advanced and emerging market economies from 1980 to
2003. These countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland,
Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Swe-
den, Turkey, and the United States. Stock return data is computed using the
MSCI country indexes, compiled from DataStream. Observations are weekly and
converted into US dollars using nominal exchange rates. Correlations between na-
tional stock returns are taken over one-year period. The sample statistics of the
data is described on Table 4.1.
Since our main interest lies in identifying the impacts of nancial integration
on stock market synchronization, measuring nancial and economic integration
properly is a key issue. Kose, Prasad, Rogo¤ and Wei (2009) discuss nancial
openness measures in detail. De jure measures of capital account openness rely on
the dating of nancial market liberalization and/or government policies on capital
account restriction, whereas de facto measures of nancial integration focus on the
outcomes of such liberalizations. Bekaert and Harvey (2003) emphasize the dis-
tinction between market liberalization and market integration and conclude that
80
announcement of market liberalization does not always coincide with the comple-
tion of de facto integration. Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2009) suggest that the use
of the de facto measures is more appropriate than the de jure measures when the
e¤ects of an outcome-based measure of nancial integration are of interest. They
also point out that the de facto measures allow us to obtain a ner characterization
of nancial openness by looking closely at the e¤ects of di¤erent types of capital
ows.
A measure of nancial integration used in this chapter is constructed based
on the usual de facto measures of nancial openness, that is, the gross stock of
external assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP taken from the External Wealth
of Nations Database complied by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The bilateral
measure of nancial integration (FININT ) is calculated as the logarithm of the
product of two countriesmeasures of de facto nancial openness, following Walti
(2008).
A panel data framework with time xed e¤ects allows us to capture unobserved
country specic e¤ects and global shocks. Our baseline specication is:
CORRi;j;t = t + i;j + FININTi;j;t 1 + X0i;j;t 1	 + "i;j;t (4.3)
where CORRi;j;t is the volatility-corrected correlations between national stock re-
turns for countries i and j at time t, FININTi;j;t 1 is the measure of nancial
integration, Xi;j;t 1 is a matrix that includes exogenous regressors, t and i;j
represent period dummies and time-invariant country-pair specic e¤ects, respec-
tively. The independent variables are lagged by one period in order to account for
the di¤erence in timing between two events.
Given this panel data approach, the inclusion of period dummies allows us to
capture the roles of common international shocks on the comovements. Likewise,
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by the inclusion of cross-sectional e¤ects we are able to account for unobserved
country pair specic heterogeneity. The Hausman tests are conducted to decide
on the use of xed or random e¤ects. The results tend to support the use of
cross-sectional random e¤ects.
In addition to the core independent variables that measure the degree of -
nancial integration, we include in regressions several control variables. Inclusion
of these control variables ensures that the estimated  is not inuenced by the
omitted variables. Bilateral trade intensity (TRAINT ) is included to capture the
e¤ects of trade integration on stock market synchronization, which is measured in
a standard way: the logarithm of bilateral imports and exports as a percent of
the two countriesGDP. Bilateral exchange rate volatility (FXV OL) is used to
control for di¤erences in currency risk. Fratzcher (2002) nd that exchange rate
volatility negatively impacts stock market comovements as the costs of portfolio
rebalancing are low.
Even with the inclusion of country-pair e¤ects, time dummies, and some proper
control variables, it is still concerned that the OLS estimates may be subject to
potential country-pair time-varying omitted variable biases. To account for the
biases, panel instrumental variable models are used by utilizing the Fitzgeral (2008)
dataset of trade costs. Fitzgerald (2008) made public her dataset, which contains
time-varying bilateral trade costs among 24 countries from 1970-2003 and is treated
as exogenous to country pairs. I make use of this trade costs data (TCOST ) to
instrument for nancial integration as well as trade integration. The rst-stage
relationship between nancial integration (FININT ) and trade costs (TCOST )
are:
FININTi;j;t = t + i;j + TCOSTi;j;t + Z
0
i;j;t + vi;j;t (4.4)
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where Zi;j;t is a matrix that includes exogenous regressions, and t and i;j represent
period dummies and time-invariant country-pair specic e¤ects, respectively. The
exogenous instruments other than trade costs include dummy variables for common
languages and for the joint EU members. The validity of the instruments are
discussed in the next section.
4.4 Results
I start my analysis by obtaining cross-sectional OLS estimates. Columns (1) to (3)
on Table 4.2 reports the OLS estimates using the volatility-corrected correlations of
stock returns as the dependent variable. The average values of variables are taken
over the latest 12 years for each country pair. As there is one observation for each
country pair, the number of observations is equal to the number of country pairs.
The cross-sectional coe¢ cient on the nancial integration measure is positive and
signicant at standard condence levels. This suggests that the return correlations
are higher for pairs with higher nancial integration.
In columns (4) and (5) on Table 4.2, the 2SLS regression results are reported.
The rst column of (4) shows the reduced-form relationship between return corre-
lations and the size of trade costs. All independent variables in the reduced-form
regression are assumed to be exogenous to the economy. The regression yields a
negative and highly signicant estimate on TCOST . This suggests that reduction
of trade costs leads to a higher degree of stock market synchronization. The next
two columns report the estimates from the rst stage regressions. The coe¢ cients
on TCOST are negative and highly signicant, which suggests that country pairs
with low trade costs are more integrated in terms of trade and nance. As the rst-
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stage F-scores are signicantly high, I would not worry about the weak instrument
problems. Finally, the last column of (4) reports the second-stage coe¢ cients.
The 2SLS estimate of nancial integration is positive and signicant at the 95%
condence level, suggesting that increases in nancial integration stemming from
reduction of trade costs are followed by higher comovements of nancial markets.
The 2SLS estimate of nancial integration remains positive and signicant even
after controlling for exchange rate volatilities (Column (5) of Table 4.2).
In Table 4.3, I report the panel OLS and panel 2SLS with and without country-
pair and/or period-specic e¤ects. The average values of variables are taken for
each four-year period between 1980-2003. Throughout the specication, the num-
ber of observations is 1652, and the number of country pairs are 276. In other
words, there are 7 observations for each country pair. Column (1) contains the
pooled OLS estimate of nancial integration. The estimate is positive and signi-
cant, suggesting that nancial integration is associated with higher comovements
of stock markets on the next period. Inclusion of period dummies does not change
this result as shown in column (2) of Table 4.3. Columns (3) and (4) report the
panel 2SLS estimates with and without period dummies. In both regressions, the
coe¢ cients on nancial integration are positive and signicant, which is consistent
with the OLS estimates. Finally, columns (5) and (6) contains the panel 2SLS re-
gression results with inclusion of country-pair e¤ects. The results of the Hausman
specication tests are in favor of the country-pair random e¤ects over the xed-
e¤ect specications. The estimates on nancial integration are positive and signif-
icant with or without the period dummies. This suggests that nancial integration
driven by reduction of trade costs leads to higher synchronization across nan-
cial markets even after controlling for cross-sectional-specic and period-specic
e¤ects.
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As sensitivity analyses, I run several regressions with alternative measures of
integration and synchronization as well as di¤erent time horizons. Table 4.4 reports
the sensitivity analysis results. Column (1) contains the panel 2SLS regression re-
sults with period dummies and country-pair e¤ects. Instead of using the volatility-
corrected correlations, the realized correlations with the Fisher-Z transformation
are used as the dependent variable. The estimate on nancial integration is posi-
tive and signicant, and this suggests that my earlier nding does not depend on
volatility correction of the realized correlations. Column (2) reports the similar
regression results to column (1). The only di¤erence is the use of log distance
between two country as instrument instead of trade costs of Fitzgerald (2008).
The estimate on nancial integration is positive and signicant, suggesting that
my nding does not rely on the choice instruments. In order to verify that the
analysis does not depend on the choice of the nancial integration measures, the
portfolio equity investments as a share of GDP is used as an independent variable
instead of the total assets and liabilities as a share of GDP. The positive and signif-
icant estimate on this measure of nancial integration supports the robustness of
the analysis. Columns (4) and (5) report the regression coe¢ cients for subperiods
1980-1991 and 1992-2003, respectively. As the estimates on nancial integration
are positive and signicant for both specications, it is conrmed that the positive
e¤ects of nancial integration on comovements of nancial market does not rely
on the choice of periods. Finally, a di¤erent time horizon is examined in column
(6). The averages of variables for each eight-year period over 1980-2003 are used in
the panel 2SLS regressions. The estimate on nancial integration is still positive
and signicant, suggesting that the result does not depend on the choice of time
horizons.
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4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I investigate whether nancial integration increases the degree of
stock market synchronization. I provide evidence of strong linkage between de
facto measures of nancial integration and the correlation of stock returns among
24 countries over the period 1980-2003. A country-pair panel instrumental vari-
ables framework is employed to explain time-varying correlations among national
stock returns, by utilizing the Fitzgerald (2008) dataset on trade costs. Although
nancial integration has an ambiguous impact on synchronization at a theoretical
level, it is found that nancial integration driven by reduction of trade costs leads
to higher degree of synchronization across stock markets.
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Figure 4.1: Financial Integration over Time
This gure shows cross-country medians and quartiles of the de facto measure of nancial
integration, which is based on the gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP.
The raw data is taken from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
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Figure 4.2: Stock Market Synchronization over Time
This gure depicts the rolling correlations between national and world stock returns over
time. The lower quartile, median, and upper quartile values of 24 countries are taken for one-
year rolling window; the solid line is the median, and the two dotted lines are the lower and
upper quartiles. Stock return data is computed using the MSCI World index, and the MSCI
country indexes, complied from DataStream. Observations are weekly and converted into US
dollars using nominal exchange rates.
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Table 4.1: Sample Statistics
The table reports summary statistics of the main variables used in the regression analysis.
CORR1 is the realized correlations between national stock returns for each four-year period.
CORR2 is the volatility-corrected correlations between national stock returns (aka Forbes and
Rigobon, 2002). CORR3 is the volatility-corrected correlations between national stock returns
after the Fisher-Z transformation. FINIINT1 is calculated as the logarithm of the product of
two countriesrespective measures of nancial integration, that is, the sum of assets and liabilities
as a percent of GDP. FININT2 is the same as FININT1 except that nancial integration
is measured by the sum of portfolio equity assets and liabilities as a percent of GDP. TRAINT
denotes the logarithm of bilateral imports and exports as a percent of the two countriesGDP.
TCOST is a bilateral index of trade costs taken from Fitzgerald (2008). DIST is the loga-
rithm of distance between the two countriescapitals. FXV OL is the standard deviations of
percent changes in the end-year exchange rates over each four-year period.
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Table 4.2: Cross-sectional Estimates, 1992-2003
This table shows the results of cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is CORR3,
the volatility-corrected correlations between national stock returns. All variables except the
exchange rate volatility are averages over the period 1992-2003. The exchange rate volatility is
the standard deviations of percent changes in the end-year exchange rates for the period 1992-
2003. The robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate
statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.3: Panel Estimates, Four-year averages, 1980-2003
This table shows the results of panel regression with four-year data. The dependent variable
is CORR3, the volatility-corrected correlations between national stock returns. All variables
except the exchange rate volatility are averages for each four-year period over 1980-2003. The
exchange rate volatility is the standard deviations of percent changes in the end-year exchange
rates for each four-year period. The robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The symbols
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.4: Sensitivity Analysis
This table shows the results of panel regression with four-year data, unless otherwise indicated.
The dependent variable is CORR3, the volatility-corrected correlations between national stock
returns, except for column (1). In Column (1), the dependent variable is CORR2, the correlations
between national stock returns without volatility correction aka Forbes and Rigobon (2002). All
variables except the exchange rate volatility are averages for each four- or eight-year period over
1980-2003. The exchange rate volatility is the standard deviations of percent changes in the
end-year exchange rates for each four-year period. The robust standard errors are reported in
brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
92
APPENDIX A
PROOFS AND DERIVATIONS
Section 2.2.5: The market clearing condition for the Home goods implies
Y H (t)Y
H
= cHH (t)
cHH (t) + cHF (t)
cHF (t) (A.1)
Apply Itos lemma to the rst order conditions:
c
H
H (t) =
1


H (t)  H (t)

(A.2)
c
H
F (t) =
1


F (t)  F (t)

Plug these in the the market clearing condition for the Home goods:
Y H (t)Y
H
= cHH (t)
1


H (t)  H (t)

+ cHF (t)
1


F (t)  F (t)

(A.3)
The market prices of risks are given by solving for H (t) and F (t) using  (t) =
F (t)  H (t).
Section 2.3.1-a
The variance of terms-of-trade is given by
V AR

dp (t)
p (t)

= V AR
0B@  A (t)

dH(t)
H(t)
  dF (t)
F (t)
  d(t)
(t)

+dY
H(t)
Y H(t)
  dY F (t)
Y F (t)
1CA (A.4)
=
8><>: [A (t)]
2 kH   F   k2
+ kA (t) + Y H   Y F k2   [A (t)]2 kk2
9>=>; dt
The covariance between the two gain processes is
COV

dSH (t) + Y H (t) dt
SH (t)
;
dSF (t) + p (t)Y F (t) dt
SF (t)

(A.5)
= COV

dY H (t)
Y H (t)
;
dY F (t)
Y F (t)

+ COV

dY H (t)
Y H (t)
;
dp (t)
p (t)

=

A (t)YH   + kY Hk2

dt
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The variance of the Home gain process is
V AR

dSH (t) + Y H (t) dt
SH (t)

= V AR

dSH (t)
SH (t)

(A.6)
= V AR

dY H (t)
Y H (t)

= kY H k2 dt
The variance of the Foreign gain process is
V AR

dSF (t) + p (t)Y F (t) dt
SF (t)

(A.7)
= V AR

dY F (t)
Y F (t)
+
dp (t)
p (t)

= V AR

 A (t)

dH (t)
H (t)
  dF (t)
F (t)
  d (t)
 (t)

+
dY H (t)
Y H (t)

=
 A (t)  H   F   + Y H2 dt
The correlation between two stock returns is given by
SHSF (t) =
SHSF (t)
kSH (t)k kSF (t)k
. (A.8)
Section 2.3.1-b: I consider the case with asymmetry related to the center
of perceived output growth rates. Dene the di¤erences in the initial levels as
  Y HH (0)   Y HF (0) = Y FF (0)   Y FH (0). Since this value  is a di¤erence
between perceived output growth across country, it is reasonable to assume that
the value is small enough to make all perceived rates to equal to or greater than
0.Dene the degree of consumption home bias a  aH aF
2
> 0. At the symmetric
equilibrium, we get by combining equations 2.18. 2.20, and 2.22:
 (0) =
1 + 2a
1  2a > 0:
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Equation 2.25 is
A (0) =
 2a
1 + 4a2
< 0. (A.9)
Thus, the derivatives of  and A with respect to a are
d (0)
da
=
4
(1  2a)2 > 0, and (A.10)
dA (0)
da
=
 2 (1 + 2a) (1  2a)
(1 + 4a2)2
< 0. (A.11)
From equations 2.9 and 2.21, the vectors of partial derivative of  with respect
to a is given by
d (0)
da
= 0. (A.12)
By combining this with equations 2.24, the vectors of partial derivative of p (t)
with respect to a is given by
dp
da
=  dA (0)
da
 (0) (A.13)
Using equations 2.28, A.10, and A.12, the derivative of SHSF with respect to a is
expressed as
dSHSF (0)
da
=  dA (0)
da
YH   (0) . (A.14)
Similarly, from equations 2.27, A.12 and A.13, the derivative of kSF (t)k with
respect to a is
d
SF (0)
da
=
SF (0) 1 SF (0)  dp (0)
da
(A.15)
Finally, using equations 2.29,A.14, and A.15, we get the derivative of the equilib-
rium correlations of stock returns SHSF with respect to a:
dSHSF (0)
da
=
1
kSH (0)k kSF (0)k
264  dA(0)da YH   (0)
  SHSF (0)kSF (0)k
dkSF (0)k
da
375
< 0.
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Section 2.3.1-c: From equations 2.9 and 2.21, the vectors of partial derivative
of  with respect to  is given by
@ (0)
@
=
0BBBB@
  1
Y H
1
Y F
0
1CCCCA . (A.16)
By combining this with equations 2.24, the vectors of partial derivative of p (t)
with respect to  is given by
@p
@
=  A (0) @
 (0)
@
(A.17)
Using equations 2.28, A.10, and ??, the derivative of SHSF with respect to  is
expressed as
dSHSF (0)
d
=  A (0)YH 
@ (0)
@
. (A.18)
Similarly, from equations 2.27, ?? and ??, the derivative of kSF (t)k with respect
to  is
d
SF (0)
d
=
d
d

Y
F  Y F + 2Y F  p (0) + p (0)  p (0)
 1
2
(A.19)
=
SF (0) 1 SF (0)  dp (0)
d
Finally, using equations 2.29,A.18, and ??, we get the derivative of the equilibrium
correlations of stock returns SHSF with respect to a:
dSHSF (0)
d
=
1
kSH (0)k kSF (0)k
A (0)
h
 YH + SHSF (0)S
F
(0)
i
 @
 (0)
@
< 0. (A.20)
Section 2.3.2: The equilibrium wealth is
WH (t) = EH;t
Z T
t
H (s)
H (t)
 
cHH (s) + p (s) c
F
H (s)

dt

(A.21)
=
H (t)Y
H (t)
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
1  e (T t)

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WF (t) = EF;t
Z T
t
F (s)
F (t)
 
cHF (s) + p (s) c
F
F (s)

dt

=
 (t) F (t)Y
H (t)
H (t) aH +  (t) F (t) aF
1  e (T t)

Market clearing condition for wealth implies that
SH (t) + SF (t) = WH (t) +WF (t) ; (A.22)
EH;t
Z T
t
e (s t) (s) ds

=  (t)
1  e (T t)

.
Substitute it to the equilibrium stock prices gives
SH (t) = Y H (t)
1  e (T t)

(A.23)
SF (t) = p (t)Y F (t)
1  e (T t)

Apply Itos Lemma to the equilibrium stock prices
dSH (t)
SH (t)
= [Ito terms] dt+
dY H (t)
Y H (t)
(A.24)
dSF (t)
SF (t)
= [Ito terms] dt+
dY F (t)
Y F (t)
+
dp (t)
p (t)
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APPENDIX B
APPROXIMATIONS FOR THE TERMS OF TRADE
The relative output ratio b is dened for convenience as:
b (t) =
Y H (t)
Y F (t)
. (B.1)
The market clearing condition for Home goods (equation 3.8) gives
 ( ; p (t)) 
1 

1
1   1
h
(1  a) (1 + )1  p (t)1  b (t)  ap (t)
i
(B.2)
=  ( ; p (t)) 
1 

1
1   1
h
a (1 + )1  p (t)  b (t) (1  a) p (t)1  
i

1

where  ( ; p (t)) = a+ (1  a) (1 + )1  p (t)1  and  ( ; p (t)) = a (1 + )1  +
(1  a) p (t)1  .
Dene F (p (t) ; ) such that F (p (t) ; ) satises
F (p (t) ; ) =  ( ; p (t)) 
1 

1
1   1
h
(1  a) (1 + )1  p (t)1  b (t)  ap (t)
i
(B.3)
  1  ( ; p (t))  1  11   1
h
a (1 + )1  p (t)  b (t) (1  a) p (t)1  
i
Using partial derivatives of F (p (t) ; ) with respect to p and  , the values of
p, @F
@
,@F
@p
are evaluated at  = 0:
[p (t)]=0 =

1  a
a
 1
 
b (t)
1
 (B.4)
@F (p (t) ; )
@

=0
= (1   )  (b (t))

1  a
a
 1
 
b (t)
1
 

1   1


@F (p (t) ; )
@p (t)

=0
=   (b (t)) 

1 + 
1


where  (b (t)) = a 
1 

1
1  
h
1 +
 
1 a
a
 1
 b (t)
1  
 
i  1 

1
1   1
.
Similarly, @
2F
@2
, and @
2F
@p2
are evaluated at  = 0:
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
@2F (p (t) ; )
@ 2

=0
=   (1   )  (b (t))

1  a
a
 1
 
b (t)
1
 (B.5)2664 2

1

   

( 1 aa )
1
 b(t)
1  
  
1

1+( 1 aa )
1
 b(t)
1  
 
+ 

1   1

3775

@2F (p (t) ; )
@p (t)2

=0
=  

1 + 
1


 (b (t))
264 2

1

   

b(t) 1
1+( 1 aa )
1
 b(t)
1  
 
  (1   )  1 a
a
  1
 b (t) 
1
 
375 (B.6)
Given these values, dp
d
and d
2p
d2
are evaluated at  = 0 as follows:
dp
d

=0
=

@F
@

=0h
@F
@p
i
=0
(B.7)
=
   1
 
1   1
1 + 
1

[p (t)]=0

d2p (t)
d 2

=0
=
h
@2F (p(t);)
@2
i
=0h
@F (p(t);)
@p(t)
i
=0
 
h
@2F (p(t);)
@p(t)2
i
=0h
@F (p(t);)
@p(t)
i
=0

dp
d

=0
2
(B.8)
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(   1) 1 
1

1+
1


1 
1

1+
1


  1
 
2
  1
  
1 a
a
 1
 b (t)
1
 
+2

1

   

  1
 

1

1+
1

( 1 aa )
1
 b(t)
1
 
1+( 1 aa )
1
 b(t)
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
1

   

  1
 
"
  1
 

1 
1

1+
1

2
  1
1+
1

#
( 1 aa )
2
 b(t)
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1+( 1 aa )
1
 b(t)
1  
 
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
The rst-order approximation of terms of trade is given:
p (t) = [p (t)]=0 + 

dp (t)
d

=0
+ o () (B.9)
=
 
1 + 
   1
 
1   1
1 + 
1

!
1  a
a
Y H (t)
Y F (t)
 1
 
+ o ()
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and, nally, the second-order approximation of terms of trade is:
p (t) = [p (t)]=0 + 

dp (t)
d

=0
+
 2
2

d2p (t)
d 2

=0
+ o
 
 2

(B.10)
=
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
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By applying Itos Lemma to the rst- and second approximations of terms of
trade, the di¤usions for both approximations are given:
Dtp (t)
p (t)
=
Y
H   Y F
 
+ o () (B.11)
up to the rst-order, and
Dtp2 (t)
p2 (t)
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1 +    1
 
1 
1

1+
1

  2
2
(   1) 1 
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1+
1
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2
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
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1 
1

1+
1

2
(   1)
+ 1+ p0(t)b(t)
 1
[1+p0(t)b(t) 1]
2  2
  1
 

1

1+
1
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1

   
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 2  +p0(t)b(t) 1
[1+p0(t)b(t) 1]
2 p0 (t) b (t)
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   
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1 
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1
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(B.12)
for the second-order.
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APPENDIX C
MALLIAVIN DERIVATIVES
In this appendix, I derive explicit expression for the Malliavin derivatives. The
Malliavin derivative of the rst-order approximation of the terms of trade process
is
Dtp (t)
p (t)
=
1
 

DtY
H (t)
Y H (t)
  DtY
F (t)
Y F (t)

. (C.1)
The Malliavin derivative of the wealth weight for Home agent h is
Dth (t)
h (t)
=
1  

[1  h (t)] a (1  a) p (t)1  
h
1  (1 + )2(1  )
i
h
a (1 + )1  + (1  a) p (t)1  
i h
a+ (1  a) (1 + )1  p (t)1  
iDtp (t)
p (t)
.
(C.2)
The Malliavin derivatives of the consumption expenditure H and F are
DtH (t)
H (t)
=
Dth (t)
h (t)
+
Y H (t)
Y H (t) + p (t)Y F (t)
DtY
H (t)
Y H (t)
+
p (t)Y F (t)
Y H (t) + p (t)Y F (t)

DtY
F (t)
Y F (t)
+
Dtp (t)
p (t)

, (C.3)
DtF (t)
F (t)
=
DtH (t)
H (t)
 

1
1  h (t)

Dth (t)
h (t)
.
The Malliavin derivative of the state price density process is
Dt (t)
 (t)
=   (1  ) (1  a) (1 + )
1  p (t)1  
a+ (1  a) (1 + )1  p (t)1  
Dtp (t)
p (t)
  DtH (t)
H (t)
(C.4)
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The Malliavin derivatives of equity prices are
DtS
H (t)
SH (t)
=  Dt (t)
 (t)
+
DtY
H (s)
Y H (s)
+
Et
hR T
t
 (s)Y H (s) Dt(s)
(s)
ds
i
Et
hR T
t
 (s)Y H (s) ds
i (C.5)
DtS
F (t)
SF (t)
=  Dt (t)
 (t)
+
DtY
F (t)
Y F (t)
(C.6)
+
Et
hR T
t
 (s)Y F (s) p (s)

Dtp(s)
p(s)
+ Dt(s)
(s)

ds
i
Et
hR T
t
 (s) p (s)Y F (s) ds
i (C.7)
Finally, the Malliavin derivatives of wealth processes are
DtWH (t)
WH (t)
=  Dt (t)
 (t)
+
Et
hR T
t
 (s)H (s)

DtH(s)
H(s)
+ Dt(s)
(s)

ds
i
Et
hR T
t
 (s)H (s) ds
i (C.8)
DtWF (t)
WF (t)
=  Dt (t)
 (t)
+
Et
hR T
t
 (s)F (s)

DtF (s)
F (s)
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